in the Interest of P.M.W. and J.A.J., Children, 559 S.W.3d 215

Department sought termination of Mother’s parental rights to two daughters; trial court terminated rights as to younger child (Joyce) but not as to older child (Polly).
Trial court appointed Department permanent managing conservator of Polly and Mother as possessory conservator; possession/access vested “at times mutually agreed” and by Attachment A (drug-test conditions and Department-supervised visits).
Case governed by former Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401 deadlines: one-year dismissal date and a possible 180-day extension; parties agreed to a 180-day extension without an on-the-record finding of “extraordinary circumstances.”
On June 9, 2017 (before the 180-day extension expired), trial was called, witnesses sworn, and one witness answered one question before the court suspended proceedings and reset trial; final termination judgment was entered after the extension period expired.
Mother appealed arguing (1) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to move to dismiss after the statutory deadlines, and (2) the possessory order for Polly failed to expressly state times/conditions for possession and access.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether counsel was ineffective for not moving to dismiss after the one-year deadline and after the 180‑day extension	Counsel should have moved to dismiss when deadlines expired, so Mother’s right to dismissal was waived	Counsel reasonably agreed to extension and reasonably could have believed trial had commenced before dismissal cutoff; law unsettled	No ineffective assistance: Mother failed Strickland first prong; counsel’s performance not shown deficient
Whether the June 9 call of the case constituted commencement of trial under former § 263.401	June 9 did not truly commence trial; thus dismissal was required	Trial court had sworn a witness and received testimony, so trial on the merits had commenced before the deadline	Law unsettled; absence of controlling precedent meant counsel not ineffective for failing to move to dismiss
Whether the possessory order specified times and conditions for Mother’s access to Polly as required by Fam. Code § 153.006(c)	Order must specify times/conditions; mutual agreement language and Attachment A left Department sole discretion, so order is unenforceable	Trial court’s order and Attachment A provided sufficient guidance and safety conditions (drug testing, supervision)	Reversed as to possession/access: order not sufficiently specific; remanded for further proceedings

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (standard for ineffective-assistance claims)
In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534 (Tex. 2003) (role of appointed counsel and standard for review)
Ex parte Martinez, 195 S.W.3d 713 (Tex. Crim. App.) (Strickland application; burden standards)
In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105 (Tex. 2006) (deference to trial counsel; strategic decisions)
In re D.S., 455 S.W.3d 750 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2015) (discussing what constitutes commencement of trial under § 263.401)
In re A.P.S., 54 S.W.3d 493 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001) (order giving managing conservator sole discretion over visitation is insufficiently specific)
In re J.Y., 528 S.W.3d 679 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017) (possession/access orders must expressly state times and conditions)