in the Interest of M.P.S., a Child, 11-20-00293-CV

The trial court terminated the parental rights of M.P.S.’s mother; she appealed.
The final termination hearing was held via Zoom on November 3, 2020; the mother was incarcerated in the local jail and was not present in person or remotely.
Mother’s counsel was present, had filed a written motion for continuance, and orally requested a continuance/assistance securing the mother’s telephone/Zoom participation after learning of her recent arrest.
The Department opposed an extension but did not object to a short delay to contact the jail and acknowledged jail personnel normally facilitate remote participation; the trial court denied continuance and proceeded.
Because the mother could not participate, she did not testify or present witnesses; the trial court found statutory grounds under Tex. Fam. Code §161.001(b)(1) (subsections D, E, N, O) and best interest and terminated parental rights.
The court of appeals held the trial court abused its discretion by denying the mother meaningful participation (denying reasonable accommodation), reversed the termination of the mother’s rights, and remanded for further proceedings (mandate to issue within 180 days); appointment of the Department as managing conservator was left intact.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying mother access to the hearing and alternatives to appear	Appellant: Denial violated due process and parental liberty interest; requested continuance/remote participation so she could testify and consult with counsel	Dept/Trial Court: Opposed extension; argued no extraordinary circumstances and case readiness justified proceeding (Dept did not oppose short delay)	Court: Trial court abused discretion; mother was improperly deprived of meaningful participation; reversal and remand

Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (due process requires a meaningful opportunity to be heard)
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (parental rights are a fundamental liberty interest)
Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (characterization of parental rights and due process standards)
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (inmates retain some access to the courts and cannot be categorically denied court access)
In re Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d 163 (Tex. 2003) (an inmate does not have an absolute right to appear in person but must be allowed alternative participation when appropriate)
Office of the Attorney Gen. of Tex. v. C.W.H., 531 S.W.3d 178 (Tex. 2017) (trial court erred by failing to consider remote participation for incarcerated parent)
J.G. v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 592 S.W.3d 515 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019) (courts should permit alternative means for inmate participation when requested)
In re L.N.C., 573 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019) (reversed termination where parent was precluded from meaningful participation)
In re D.W., 498 S.W.3d 100 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016) (trial court should have considered telephone participation and given counsel time to facilitate it)
In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611 (Tex. 2007) (reversal of parental rights does not necessarily disturb appointment of Department as managing conservator)