In the Interest of: L.J.B Appeal of: A.A.R.
199 A.3d 868
Pa.2018Background
- Mother (A.A.R.) used opioids and marijuana after release from incarceration, learned she was pregnant, entered treatment (methadone, then subutex), relapsed, and tested positive for multiple substances during pregnancy.
- Child (L.J.B.) was born January 27, 2017, tested positive for subutex and marijuana at birth, developed neonatal abstinence syndrome (NAS), required treatment, and remained hospitalized; hospital staff notified county CYS.
- CYS obtained emergency protective custody and filed dependency and child-abuse allegations alleging Mother’s prenatal drug use “caused bodily injury” or created a reasonable likelihood of bodily injury under the CPSL.
- Juvenile court adjudicated Child dependent but held Mother’s prenatal conduct could not be the basis for a CPSL child-abuse finding because a fetus/unborn child is not a “child” under the statute; trial court declined to find Mother a perpetrator for conduct before birth.
- Superior Court reversed, holding that illegal drug use while pregnant may constitute child abuse under 23 Pa.C.S. § 6303(b.1) if the prenatal act caused or created a reasonable likelihood of bodily injury to the now-born child within the statute’s two-year “recent act” window.
- Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review and reversed the Superior Court: because the CPSL defines a “perpetrator” by relationship to a “child,” and a “child” does not include a fetus, a mother cannot be a perpetrator for actions taken while the child was unborn; therefore prenatal drug use cannot constitute CPSL child abuse.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Mother) | Defendant's Argument (CYS) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a mother’s drug use while pregnant can be a CPSL child-abuse act against the fetus that later causes injury to the born child | Statute’s definitions require a “child” and a “perpetrator” at time of the act; fetus is not a “child,” so prenatal conduct cannot be child abuse | Section 6386 contemplates reporting and possible child-protective services when a newborn is affected by prenatal drug exposure, so prenatal drug use can be treated as child abuse once the child is born | Court held prenatal drug use cannot be child abuse under CPSL because a perpetrator must have committed the act against an existing “child”; fetus is not covered, so mother was not a perpetrator at time of the act |
| Whether statutory scheme and purpose support treating prenatal drug exposure as child abuse to protect future children | CPSL’s reporting provisions and remedial aims do not override the statutory definitions; labeling mothers as perpetrators would deter care and conflict with legislative definitions | CYS argued protective services framework implies prenatal exposure can trigger child-abuse finding to protect current/future children | Court held legislative definitions control; CPSL requires an existing child at time of the abusive act and institutional changes (e.g., amendments) would be legislative, not judicial |
Key Cases Cited
- P.R. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 801 A.2d 478 (Pa. 2002) (discussing statewide database and protective purpose of CPSL)
- Commonwealth v. Fant, 146 A.3d 1254 (Pa. 2016) (standard of review for statutory interpretation)
- In re L.B., 177 A.3d 308 (Pa. Super. 2017) (Superior Court decision holding prenatal illegal drug use may constitute CPSL child abuse)
- Kmonk-Sullivan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 788 A.2d 955 (Pa. 2001) (statutory interpretation principle: consider what a statute does not say)
- Olson v. Kucenic, 133 A.2d 596 (Pa. 1957) (statutes should be construed as an integral part of the whole structure)
- Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 753 A.2d 807 (Pa. 2000) (courts must not read into an unambiguous statute language that is not there)
- In re L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172 (Pa. 2017) (statutory interpretation; apply clear and unambiguous language of statute)
- Commonwealth v. Smith, 186 A.3d 397 (Pa. 2018) (interpret legislative intent by reading words in context)