in the Interest of K.A.H., a Child
05-16-01067-CV
| Tex. App. | Apr 27, 2017Background
- DFPS removed three-year-old K.A.H. after an August 2015 referral showing bruising; petition filed August 6, 2015.
- Child returned to Mother on a monitored return in February 2016, then re-removed after severe traumatic brain injuries on February 28, 2016; hospitalization, coma, and rehab followed. DFPS filed for termination; dismissal deadline set for August 26, 2016.
- Mother’s retained counsel withdrew May 2, 2016; Mother delayed requesting appointed counsel and new counsel was appointed June 2, 2016.
- New counsel filed a written answer and jury demand on June 29, 2016 (35 days before the August 3, 2016 trial setting). Discovery deadline was five days later.
- On August 3, 2016 the Department moved to proceed as a bench trial to permit mediation and still complete proceedings before the August 26 dismissal deadline; the trial court found the June 29 demand, though filed more than 30 days before the setting, was not made a "reasonable time" before trial under Tex. R. Civ. P. 216 and denied the jury demand.
- The court recessed and later conducted a bench trial on August 24, 2016, terminating Mother’s parental rights; Mother appealed only the denial of the jury demand.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Mother’s jury demand | Mother: jury demand filed >30 days before trial satisfied Tex. R. Civ. P. 216; denial was improper | Department/Court: demand, though >30 days, was not filed a "reasonable time" before trial given looming dismissal deadline, docket constraints, and need for expert discovery | Court: No abuse of discretion; denial justified because demand was not timely in a practical sense under Rule 216 and would have disrupted docket and prejudiced parties |
Key Cases Cited
- Mercedes–Benz Credit Corp. v. Rhyne, 925 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. 1996) (standard for reviewing denial of jury demand and discretionary rulings)
- Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. 1985) (abuse-of-discretion standard explained)
- Halsell v. Dehoyos, 810 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. 1991) (presumption that a jury demand filed >30 days before trial is reasonable unless it would injure the opposing party or disrupt the docket)
- In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2002) (procedural requirements and standards in parental-rights termination proceedings)
- In re J.N.F., 116 S.W.3d 426 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003) (appellate review of trial court’s denial of jury demand under abuse-of-discretion)
- Gen. Motors Corp. v. Gayle, 951 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. 1997) (constitutional protection of the jury right)
