in the Interest of K.R.P.C., a Child
05-16-00405-CV
| Tex. App. | Jan 26, 2017Background
- James J. Perry (pro se) is the adoptive grandfather of K.R.P.C.; his son William is the child’s father and has not had his parental rights terminated. The child resides with William.
- Perry filed an original petition (Jan 2016) seeking grandparent access/possession under Texas Family Code §§153.432–.434 or relief under Chapter 156; he submitted affidavits required by the statute.
- William moved to dismiss, arguing Perry failed to allege required statutory facts (including the condition in §153.433(a)(3)) and lacked standing under Chapter 156.
- The trial court granted William’s motion and dismissed Perry’s suit with prejudice; Perry appealed pro se.
- The court of appeals reviewed whether Perry’s affidavits alleged facts satisfying §153.432/.433 and whether Troxel v. Granville supplied broader rights for grandparents.
- The court concluded Perry’s pleadings did not show that William was incarcerated, incompetent, dead, or lacked possession/access to the child as required by §153.433(a)(3), and affirmed dismissal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Perry’s pleadings/affidavits satisfy the statutory prerequisites for grandparent access under Fam. Code §§153.432–153.433 | Perry asserted he met statutory requirements and submitted affidavits alleging harm if access denied | William argued the affidavits fail to allege the §153.433(a)(3) condition (incarceration, incompetence, death, or lack of possession/access) and thus suit must be dismissed | Held: Perry’s affidavits did not show §153.433(a)(3) was met; dismissal affirmed (statutory prerequisites not satisfied) |
| Whether Troxel v. Granville supplies a constitutional or common-law basis to order grandparent visitation despite failure to meet Texas statutory conditions | Perry relied on Troxel to argue courts can order visitation when parental refusal treats child like chattel and prior positive history with third party suggests visitation benefits child | William argued Troxel does not create a grandparent right to visitation or override Texas statutory limits; parents’ fundamental rights control | Held: Troxel was misread by Perry; it does not create a freestanding grandparent right or authorize courts to override parental decisions absent statutory authorization; Troxel does not help Perry |
Key Cases Cited
- Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (Due Process protects parents’ right to make child-rearing decisions; struck down statute allowing courts to grant visitation over parental wishes without giving weight to parents’ determination)
- Washington v. Bank of N.Y., 362 S.W.3d 853 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012) (pro se pleadings are liberally construed but pro se litigants must follow procedural rules)
- Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. 1978) (pro se litigants are held to same standards as attorneys)
- Shull v. United Parcel Serv., 4 S.W.3d 46 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999) (pet. denied) (same principle regarding pro se litigants)
