in the Interest of K.M.-J. AKA K.M-J and D.A.R.-J. v. Department of Family and Protective Services
01-15-00253-CV
| Tex. App. | Jun 2, 2015Background
- DFPS removed two children (K.M.-J., b. 2010; D.A.R.-J., b. 2011) after the death of a third child, Jonathan, from blunt-force abdominal trauma; the children’s father, J.A.R.-E., admitted striking Jonathan and was charged.
- Mother (H.J.-A.) had no CPS or criminal history, completed her Family Service Plan, maintained visitation, and testified she did not see the fatal assault and gave inconsistent statements under alleged pressure.
- DFPS introduced medical records from Texas Children’s Hospital (admitted as DFPS Ex. 17) containing physicians’ opinions (Dr. Louis and a radiologist) suggesting nonaccidental trauma and untreated injuries to K.M.-J.; mother objected that those experts were not disclosed per Tex. R. Civ. P. 194.2(f).
- Trial court overruled discovery objections, admitted DFPS Ex. 17, and found clear-and-convincing evidence to terminate mother’s parental rights under Tex. Fam. Code §161.001(1)(D) and (E), also finding termination was in the children’s best interest.
- Mother appeals, arguing (1) admitting DFPS Ex. 17 violated discovery rules and prejudiced her, (2) evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the (D) and (E) termination grounds, and (3) evidence was insufficient to show termination was in the children’s best interest.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Mother) | Defendant's Argument (DFPS) | Held (trial court) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Admission of DFPS Ex. 17 (undisclosed expert opinions) | Admission violated Tex. R. Civ. P. 194.2(f)/193.6 because DFPS never supplemented disclosures to identify Drs. Louis/Seghers; exclusion required; error was prejudicial because court relied on the report | Exhibit properly admitted; DFPS relied on medical records and expert opinions in them to show abuse/nonaccidental trauma and lack of treatment | Court admitted DFPS Ex. 17 over objection and referenced physician statements in its ruling |
| 2. Sufficiency of evidence for §161.001(1)(D) and (E) (endangerment) | Evidence is speculative as to mother’s conduct or knowledge; primary perpetrator was father; no medical experts testified; DFPS relied on inadmissible records, so remaining evidence cannot support a finding of a conscious course of endangering conduct | Evidence (autopsy, medical records, bruising, father’s admission) supports imputation of risk/allowing child to remain in dangerous surroundings and parental conduct allowing endangerment | Court found evidence sufficient to terminate under subsections (D) and (E) |
| 3. Sufficiency of evidence that termination is in children's best interest | Mother completed FSP, is bonded with children, no permanency yet for DFPS, children are placed but foster family won’t adopt; the record does not support severing the parent–child bond | DFPS argues children’s safety and medical findings justify termination as being in their best interest | Court concluded termination was in the children’s best interest |
Key Cases Cited
- Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (U.S. 1982) (termination proceedings implicate fundamental liberty interests and require heightened proof)
- In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2002) (standard for legal and factual sufficiency under clear-and-convincing evidence)
- In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796 (Tex. 2012) (government must produce evidence of endangering conduct and avoid mere conjecture)
- In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17 (Tex. 2002) (Holley factors and best-interest analysis guidance)
- Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. 1976) (nonexclusive factors for best-interest determination)