in the Interest of J.W., a Child, 645 S.W.3d 726

Background

DFPS sought termination of Father's parental rights to J.W. under Texas Family Code §161.001(b)(1) (grounds including (D), (E), and (O)) and best‑interest requirement.
Mother used illegal drugs during pregnancy; she left an in‑patient program midpregnancy because she could not take promethazine with codeine.
Father knew of Mother’s substance use, minimized/denied it to DFPS, allowed a recently‑released prisoner/friend to stay while Mother was eight months pregnant (the friend later overdosed in the home), and later provided his urine to help Mother fake a drug test.
Father testified he traveled for work during much of the pregnancy and claimed he did what he reasonably could to protect the child.
A jury found in favor of termination on a broad form asking about (D), (E), and (O) together; the Texas Supreme Court majority accepted that subsection (D) can protect unborn children but remanded for a new trial under Crown Life because the jury question combined multiple grounds. Justice Boyd dissented, arguing the evidence was legally sufficient to support termination under (D), (E), and (O) and would have affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (DFPS)	Defendant's Argument (Father)	Held (Court)
Whether §161.001(b)(1)(D) protects unborn children	(D) covers prenatal dangerous conditions and may justify termination	Father argued he did not place or knowingly allow prenatal danger; his absence and conduct were not sufficient	Majority: (D) can protect unborn children (affirmative holding)
Whether evidence was legally sufficient to terminate under (D)/(E)/(O) based on Father’s conduct/inaction during pregnancy	Evidence showed Father knew of and enabled Mother’s drug use, allowed dangerous persons in home, and aided in faking a drug test—sufficient for termination	Father relied on work travel, testimony that he did what he could, and disputed factual inferences	Majority: declined to uphold jury’s (D) finding on this record and did not reach (E); remanded for new trial; Justice Boyd dissented and would have affirmed for all three grounds
Standard of review and deference to jury credibility in sufficiency review	Apply legal‑sufficiency standard: view evidence in light most favorable to verdict and defer to reasonable credibility determinations	Father argued evidence insufficient as a matter of law	Majority applied the standard but concluded no reasonable juror could have formed requisite belief as to (D) on this record; dissent argued deference compels affirmance
Whether Crown Life/Casteel requires remand because the jury was asked in a single broad question about multiple statutory grounds	DFPS urged that at least one ground was supported, avoiding reversible harm	Father and majority stressed that combining discrete statutory grounds in a single question can create harmful ambiguity requiring remand	Held: Court remanded for new trial under Crown Life because the verdict form asked about (D), (E), and (O) in one broad question

Key Cases Cited

Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378 (Tex. 2000) (error and remand principles for multi‑ground verdict forms)
In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2002) (legal‑sufficiency review: view evidence in light most favorable and defer to reasonable jury findings)
In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. 2009) (subsection (E) can apply to conduct before birth)
In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570 (Tex. 2005) (consider contrary evidence when assessing legal sufficiency)
City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005) (standards for reviewing sufficiency and jury findings)
Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Garza, 164 S.W.3d 607 (Tex. 2004) (deference to jury credibility determinations)
In re S.M.R., 434 S.W.3d 576 (Tex. 2014) (frequent conflation of subsections (D) and (E) as endangerment grounds)
In re M.C., 917 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. 1996) (analysis treating (D) and (E) together)
In re B.R., 822 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1992) (persons living in the home can create dangerous conditions)
In re S.K., 198 S.W.3d 899 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006) (affirming termination where father left children with a parent he knew was dangerous)