516 S.W.3d 674
Tex. App.2017Background
- In 2010 the 307th Judicial District Court of Gregg County entered a final order establishing parentage and conservatorship for child J.I.M., thereby acquiring continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under Tex. Fam. Code § 155.001.
- In 2015 the Department filed a Chapter 262 petition in Gregg County Court at Law No. 2 (CCL), obtained temporary emergency orders, and sought termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights.
- The Department’s petition asserted the CCL had jurisdiction but its supporting affidavit and other filings indicated the children had previously been the subject of suits affecting the parent-child relationship, putting the CCL on notice of the prior 2010 district-court order.
- The Attorney General’s answer specifically informed the CCL of the 2010 district-court order; the 2010 order was also admitted into evidence at trial.
- Chapter 262 permits emergency and temporary orders and requires transfer to the court of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under procedures in Chapter 155 (Tex. Fam. Code § 262.203).
- The Department later conceded the 2010 order ‘‘appears to be’’ a final order establishing continuing, exclusive jurisdiction and that no vital-statistics unit filing was in the record.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether CCL had jurisdiction to enter a final termination order after a district court had earlier acquired continuing, exclusive jurisdiction | CCL may hear Chapter 262 suits and enter necessary orders; petition asserted no other court had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction | District court’s 2010 final order vested it with continuing, exclusive jurisdiction; CCL must transfer the case under §262.203/Chapter 155 | CCL lacked jurisdiction; its termination order was void, the judgment is vacated and the case dismissed |
| Effect of not obtaining vital-statistics unit information before final order | Department relied on its petition and affidavit and did not have vital-statistics unit filing in record | Mother pointed to prior district-court order and §155 tracking requirements; said CCL should have transferred or confirmed jurisdiction before finalizing | Regardless of void vs. voidable distinctions, because the district court had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction and the appeal was timely, the termination judgment is vacated |
Key Cases Cited
- In re T.S.L., 196 S.W.3d 233 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2006) (district court lacked jurisdiction where another district court had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction)
- Celestine v. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 321 S.W.3d 222 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2010) (continuing, exclusive jurisdiction prevents other courts from entering orders affecting the same child)
- In re Aguilera, 37 S.W.3d 43 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2000) (chapter 155 transfer procedures are exclusive mechanism for moving SAPCRs between courts)
- In re C.G., 495 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2016) (statutory continuing, exclusive jurisdiction is truly jurisdictional; orders by other courts are void)
- Hathorn v. Sivers, 962 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1998) (Chapter 155 and 262 transfer procedures are the only proper mechanism for transferring SAPCRs)
- PNS Stores, Inc. v. Rivera, 379 S.W.3d 267 (Tex. 2012) (distinguishes void and voidable judgments; a timely direct attack may vacate either)
- Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860 (Tex. 2010) (explains when a judgment is void due to lack of jurisdiction)