in the Interest of J.A.L., C.C.L., Jr., C.N.L. and M.R.L., Children
14-16-00614-CV
| Tex. App. | Sep 19, 2017Background
- Divorce decree (Oct. 31, 2008) required Father to pay $5,000/month child support to Mother.
- Mother filed a first enforcement motion on April 9, 2013 seeking arrearages through April 1, 2013 and requested contempt for prospective missed payments through the hearing; hearing held March 3, 2014.
- The March 2014 order found arrearages “as of August 1, 2013,” assessed $168,750 plus interest, and held Father in contempt for 58 violations; the order included a Mother Hubbard clause denying other relief.
- Mother filed a second enforcement motion on July 31, 2015 seeking arrearages for September 1, 2013 through March 1, 2014.
- Father moved to dismiss on res judicata grounds, arguing those arrearages were or could have been litigated in the first enforcement action; the trial court granted the motion (treated as summary judgment on appeal).
- The Fourteenth Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding res judicata did not bar recovery for September 2013–March 2014 arrearages.
Issues
| Issue | Mother’s Argument | Father’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether res judicata bars recovery of arrearages from Sept. 2013–Mar. 2014 | These arrearages were not litigated in the first action and were not mature when the first enforcement motion was filed | First proceeding (including March 2014 hearing and Mother Hubbard clause) resolved or could have resolved arrearages through March 2014, so res judicata applies | Res judicata does not bar recovery; first judgment covered arrearages only through Aug. 1, 2013 and later arrearages were not mature at filing |
| Whether the first motion’s request for contempt (including prospective violations) precluded later claims | Contempt request did not convert to a judgment covering future, not-yet-due payments | Prospective contempt language and the final order’s Hubbard clause show intent to include later arrearages | The contempt language was limited to listed future dates (May–Aug 2013); contempt and money judgment are distinct; Hubbard clause not enough to expand the judgment |
| Whether the operative date for maturity (for res judicata/compulsory-counterclaim analysis) is filing or hearing | Filing date governs; claims not due at filing are not mature and thus not precluded | Operative date is hearing date, so arrearages that accrued before the hearing were mature and precluded | Filing date is operative; allowing hearing date would nullify Fam. Code §157.002(e)’s optional treatment of future violations |
| Whether Mother sought duplicative recovery across two enforcement actions | Mother did not seek duplicate recovery; first action covered through Aug. 2013, second seeks Sept. 2013–Mar. 2014 | Mother’s second action improperly relitigates arrearages that were or could have been addressed earlier | No duplicative recovery; second action covers a distinct time period and is permissible |
Key Cases Cited
- Hallco Tex., Inc. v. McMullen Cty., 221 S.W.3d 50 (Tex. 2006) (describing res judicata/claim-preclusion standard)
- Getty Oil Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 845 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. 1992) (res judicata bars claims that were or could have been litigated)
- Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656 (Tex. 2005) (standard of review for summary judgment)
- Sci. Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. 1997) (traditional summary-judgment burden on affirmative defenses)
- Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Valero Energy Corp., 997 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. 1999) (a claim is mature when it accrues)