509 S.W.3d 84
Mo.2017Background
- Father incarcerated since July 2013 (chronic-offender DWI and other convictions); conditional release Nov 14, 2018. Child born Feb 2014 and placed in foster care shortly after due to concerns about mother; Father never had physical contact with Child.
- Juvenile court adjudicated Father as biological father, found Child could not be returned because of Father’s incarceration/criminal history/substance issues, and ordered an incarcerated parent treatment plan.
- Children’s Division filed petition to terminate both parents’ rights July 2015; trial occurred with Father participating by videoconference (in-person attendance denied).
- Trial evidence: Father sent minimal monetary support and letters, had no established bond with Child, and had inconsistent proof of treatment while incarcerated; Child bonded with foster parents and called them “mom”/“dad.”
- Trial court terminated Father’s parental rights under § 211.447.5(2) (neglect), (3) (failure to rectify conditions), and (6)(a) (unfitness), and found termination was in Child’s best interest; Father appealed raising statutory vagueness, sufficiency/weight of evidence, best-interest, and procedural claims.
Issues
| Issue | Father’s Argument | State’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constitutional vagueness of § 211.447.5(6)(a) as applied (inquiry whether statute equates incarceration with unfitness) | §211.447.5(6)(a) is vague if it can be read to equate incarceration with unfitness; §211.447.7(6) prohibits incarceration alone from being grounds | §211.447.7(6) by its terms does not apply to §211.447.5(6)(a); statute’s language is understandable and not vague | Court rejected vagueness claim; statute not unconstitutionally vague as applied |
| Failure to rectify (§ 211.447.5(3)) — sufficiency/weight of evidence | Father argued insufficient evidence (e.g., chemical dependency not shown untreatable); suggested placement with paternal grandmother would address harm | Court emphasized statutory elements (1-year jurisdiction, persistent harmful conditions, little likelihood of early remedy/impairing child’s prospects) and relied on Father’s incarceration, lack of bond, ongoing absence, and Child’s foster bond | Affirmed: substantial evidence supported all three elements; termination proper under §211.447.5(3) |
| Unfitness (§ 211.447.5(6)(a)) — sufficiency/weight of evidence | Father contended no evidence of statutory “abuse” and incarceration alone cannot constitute the required pattern/abuse | Legislature defined “consistent pattern of committing a specific abuse” to include specific conditions of parent-child relationship (duration/nature); duration of incarceration and Child’s infancy can render parent unable for reasonably foreseeable future | Affirmed: substantial evidence supported finding Father unfit under §211.447.5(6)(a) based on prolonged absence, lack of bond, and volitional criminal activity |
| Procedural claims: (1) denial of in-person attendance, (2) denial of continuance, (3) denial of change of judge, and (4) claim of impaired confidential communication with counsel | (1) Denial violated due process/right to attend; (2) needed continuance to await placement ruling; (3) judge prejudged matter by denying placement; (4) video setup prevented confidential communications impairing effective assistance | No constitutional right to in-person attendance at civil trial; writ to attend is discretionary; continuance denial within trial court discretion; adverse rulings do not require recusal; ineffective-assistance claim requires showing counsel not effective and mere inability to communicate in real time is insufficient | Court affirmed: procedural rulings not reversible; videoconference participation did not establish denial of effective assistance on this record |
Key Cases Cited
- J.A.R. v. D.G.R., 426 S.W.3d 624 (Mo. banc 2014) (standard of appellate review in parental-termination bench trials)
- Murphy v. Carrón, 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. banc 1976) (burden of proof guidance cited for termination standards)
- In re Adoption of C.M.B.R., 332 S.W.3d 793 (Mo. banc 2011) (review standards for parental termination and best-interest inquiry)
- Bd. of Educ. of City of St. Louis v. State, 47 S.W.3d 366 (Mo. banc 2001) (vagueness standard for statutes)
- Call v. Heard, 925 S.W.2d 840 (Mo. banc 1996) (no constitutional right to appear in person at civil trial; access-to-courts principles)
- In re C.S., 351 S.W.3d 264 (Mo. App. 2011) (incarceration duration and child’s age relevant to foreseeability and bonding post-release)