in the Interest of I.D.R., and A.B.R., Children
14-19-00384-CV
| Tex. App. | Jun 22, 2021Background:
- The Office of the Attorney General filed a parentage suit June 19, 2018; Mother executed a waiver of service and an agreed order for parentage testing that set a merits hearing for February 5, 2019.
- Mother did not appear at the February 5 hearing; the trial court entered a default order (Feb. 6, 2019) adjudicating parentage, awarding retroactive child support back to Jan. 1, 2016, naming Father managing conservator, and imposing "continuously supervised" possessory access for Mother.
- Mother timely obtained counsel and moved for new trial under Craddock, alleging her failure to appear was due to car trouble and pregnancy-related medical complications and attaching call logs and an ER record.
- Mother also alleged a meritorious defense: she was the primary caretaker from birth until October 2017 when Father and his family allegedly removed the children by force, which, if true, would affect back-support liability.
- At the new-trial hearing Father did not appear and the OAG offered no evidence; the trial court denied the motion. On appeal the court evaluated whether the Craddock factors were met.
- The court of appeals held Mother satisfied all three Craddock prongs, concluded the trial court abused its discretion in denying relief, reversed the default judgment, and remanded for a new trial.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Rogers' motion to set aside the default judgment under Craddock | Rogers: failure to appear was accidental (car trouble, pregnancy), she has a meritorious defense, and granting a new trial would not injure OAG; she offered to proceed quickly and reimburse costs | OAG: Rogers' excuse was conclusory and the court could disbelieve her testimony | Court: Rogers met all three Craddock factors; denial was an abuse of discretion; judgment reversed and remanded |
| Whether the judgment was a post-answer default versus nihil dicit and impact on relief | Rogers: the default was post-answer and should be set aside under Craddock | OAG: argued court could treat the judgment as it saw fit (including disbelief of Rogers) | Court: did not need to decide the default type; Craddock applies to all defaults and was controlling here |
| Whether Rogers established a meritorious defense affecting back child support | Rogers: she had possession Jan 2016–Oct 2017 and would be entitled to credit against retroactive support | OAG: offered no contrary evidence at new-trial hearing | Court: Rogers’ uncontroverted allegations, if proved, constitute a meritorious defense sufficient under Craddock |
| Whether the default judgment’s supervised-access condition was supported by legally/factually sufficient evidence | Rogers: supervised access ordered "continuously supervised" by Father lacked evidentiary support | OAG: defended the judgment | Court: did not reach sufficiency issue because reversal on Craddock afforded the greatest relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. 1939) (three-factor test for setting aside default judgments)
- Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Co. v. Drewery Constr. Co., 186 S.W.3d 571 (Tex. 2006) (uncontroverted testimony about defaulting party's knowledge/acts cannot be disregarded)
- Cliff v. Huggins, 724 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. 1987) (standard of review: abuse of discretion for denial of motion to set aside default judgment)
- Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc. v. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d 922 (Tex. 2009) (trial court must grant new trial if all Craddock elements are met)
- In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112 (Tex. 2006) (what constitutes a meritorious defense under Craddock)
- Dir., State Emp. Workers' Comp. Div. v. Evans, 889 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. 1994) (analysis focuses on defendant's knowledge and acts; burden shifts on injury/delay issue)
- Strackbein v. Prewitt, 671 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. 1984) (failure-to-appear inquiry centers on the defendant's knowledge and actions)