550 S.W.3d 151
Tex.2018Background
- Heather lived with her maternal grandparents from birth to ~23 months; grandparents were her primary caregivers for at least eight months while mother entered a sober‑living program.
- A prior SAPCR order (Aug 29, 2013) appointed the parents as joint managing conservators and gave Mother the exclusive right to designate primary residence; Father had alternating‑weekend possession.
- From March 30 to October 6, 2014, grandparents provided Heather’s daily care, paid for daycare, managed day‑to‑day routines, and handled many medical visits; parents remained involved and consented to the arrangement.
- Grandparents filed a petition (Oct 6, 2014) seeking managing conservatorship under Tex. Fam. Code §102.003(a)(9) (nonparent standing after six months’ actual care, control, and possession).
- Trial court dismissed for lack of standing, and the court of appeals affirmed, holding nonparent standing requires parental unfitness or abdication. The Supreme Court of Texas granted review.
- The Supreme Court reversed, holding grandparents satisfied the statute’s requirements and thus had standing; remanded for merits proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a nonparent who lived with and acted as a child’s daily caregiver for ≥6 months has standing under Tex. Fam. Code §102.003(a)(9) | Grandparents: “actual care, control, and possession” means factual, day‑to‑day parental role (residence, daily care, guidance) regardless of legal authority or parents’ continued involvement | Parents: statute requires legal/constructive control or parental abdication/unfitness; otherwise parental liberty interests bar suit | Held: statutory language covers factual, parent‑like day‑to‑day care and control (shared principal residence, daily physical/psychological care, and parenting‑style guidance); no requirement of legal authority, exclusivity, permanence, or parental abdication to establish standing. |
| Whether Troxel v. Granville requires narrowing §102.003(a)(9) to avoid constitutional interference with parental rights | Parents: Troxel (parental constitutional right) compels limiting nonparent standing to cases of unfitness/abdication | Grandparents: §102.003(a)(9) is a narrowly tailored, higher threshold than Troxel’s ‘‘any person’’ statute; Troxel doesn’t bar recognizing de facto parent roles | Held: Troxel does not invalidate §102.003(a)(9) as construed; statute is narrower than the Washington statute in Troxel and includes procedural/merits safeguards elsewhere. |
| Whether the statute requires exclusivity or permanence of the caregiving arrangement | Parents: standing should require exclusive/legal control or intent of permanence | Grandparents: statute requires six months of actual care/control/possession, not exclusivity or permanence | Held: No exclusivity or permanence requirement; temporary but continuous parent‑like care for six months suffices. |
| Proper interpretation of “actual care, control, and possession” — factual vs. legal standard | Grandparents/Jasek line: “actual” modifies all three; focus on factual exercise of guidance and daily management | Parents/K.K.C. line: “control” requires legal authority or decision‑making power of legal significance | Held: Adopted factual/de facto standard (Jasek): actual = real, physical exercise of care and control (day‑to‑day guidance), not legal custody. |
Key Cases Cited
- Austin Nursing Ctr. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845 (Tex. 2005) (standing is jurisdictional threshold)
- Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (parental liberty interest in child‑rearing limits third‑party visitation statutes)
- Jasek v. Texas Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 348 S.W.3d 523 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011) (interpreting “actual care, control, and possession” as factual/parent‑like control)
- In re K.K.C., 292 S.W.3d 788 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2009) (advocating a legal‑control/parental‑abdication view)
- Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2011) (statutory interpretation: modifiers apply to following series; courts may not add statutory terms)
- In re Lankford, 501 S.W.3d 681 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2016) (discussing divergent approaches to “control”)
- In re C.J.N.–S., 540 S.W.3d 589 (Tex. 2018) (statutory interpretation principles)
- Tenaska Energy, Inc. v. Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLC, 437 S.W.3d 518 (Tex. 2014) (deference to trial‑court findings supported by evidence)