in the Interest of H.S., a Minor Child
550 S.W.3d 151
Tex.2018Background
- Heather, a minor, lived with her grandparents while her mother entered a temporary rehabilitation program; the move was agreed to be temporary.
- Trial court found grandparents provided daily care and possession but that both mother and father remained actively involved, made medical decisions, and never intended to relinquish control.
- Grandparents sued under Tex. Fam. Code § 102.003(a)(9) (non-parent standing after "actual care, control, and possession" for six months).
- The court of appeals dismissed for lack of standing, holding non-parents cannot gain standing while fit parents retain actual control.
- Justice Blacklock (dissenting) argues the statute’s three terms—actual care, control, and possession—must be given independent meaning and that "actual control" requires parents to have relinquished ultimate decision-making before non-parents may sue.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope of § 102.003(a)(9) standing—what constitutes "actual care, control, and possession" | Grandparents: their daily caregiving, payment for expenses, managing day-to-day activities, and residence satisfy all three elements for standing. | Parents: although grandparents provided care/possession, parents retained ultimate decision-making authority and thus did not relinquish "actual control." | Justice Blacklock (dissent): "actual control" requires someone to have the functional, ultimate decision-making authority of a parent; grandparents lacked that here, so no standing. |
| Meaning of "control" in the statute—day-to-day vs. ultimate decision-making | Grandparents: "control" can be satisfied by day-to-day governance similar to parental care. | Parents: "control" must mean more than day-to-day care; it means authority to make important decisions (residence, medical, education), which parents retained. | Justice Blacklock: "control" must be distinct from care and possession and denotes the power to make major decisions; parents retained that power. |
| Application of statutory text—whether terms may be collapsed into a single "parent-like role" test | Grandparents: the combined facts show a "parent-like" role sufficient to meet the statute. | Parents: collapsing the three terms renders "control" surplusage; statutory text requires each element be independently satisfied. | Justice Blacklock: statutes must give effect to each word; the court should not conflate the three requirements. |
| Constitutional concerns—risk of burdening parental rights by expansive non-parent standing | Parents: allowing non-parents to sue while fit parents exercise authority risks unconstitutional intrusion on fundamental parental rights (Troxel). | Grandparents: statute permits suits by non-parents meeting the statutory elements; constitutional concerns are not decisive if statute allows standing. | Justice Blacklock: construe statute to avoid constitutional questions—prefer the reading that protects parents’ fundamental right to direct child upbringing. |
Key Cases Cited
- Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality recognizing parents’ fundamental right to make decisions concerning care, custody, and control of their children)
- BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789 (Tex. 2002) (deferential legal-sufficiency review of trial-court fact findings)
- Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. 1991) (trial-court findings afforded same force as a jury verdict)
- Jasek v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 348 S.W.3d 523 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011) (distinguishing legal control from factual "actual control" where parents had been removed)
- In re Mays-Hooper, 189 S.W.3d 777 (Tex. 2006) (applying Troxel to reverse an order granting visitation to grandparents over a custodial parent’s objection)
- Marino v. Lenoir, 526 S.W.3d 403 (Tex. 2017) (discussing relationship between legal and actual control)
- Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (noting fundamental liberty interest of parents in care, custody, and management of their children)
- Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (recognizing broad parental authority historically protected)
- Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (parent-child relationship is constitutionally protected)
- Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (parental interest in care and custody given strong constitutional respect)
- Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (recognizing parental primary role in upbringing as an enduring tradition)