in the Interest of H.N.B., a Child, 12-16-00246-CV

Child H.N.B. became subject of a Department of Family and Protective Services petition filed August 10, 2015 seeking protection, conservatorship, and termination of parental rights.
Father/appellant C.L.B. was convicted of burglary of a habitation and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment on January 6, 2016; the Department was temporary managing conservator.
The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that termination was authorized under Texas Family Code §161.001(b)(1)(Q) (knowing criminal conduct resulting in conviction and confinement making the parent unable to care for the child for ≥2 years from filing) and that termination was in the child’s best interest.
At trial, evidence about parole was conflicting: a Department caseworker testified earliest projected parole was April 2018; C.L.B. testified his next parole review was March 2017 and that trustee status and time credits (~511 days credited) increased his chances of earlier release.
The trial court resolved the conflicts against C.L.B. and terminated his parental rights; the mother had executed an irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment and is not a party to this appeal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether evidence was legally and factually sufficient under §161.001(b)(1)(Q) that C.L.B. was imprisoned and unable to care for the child for not less than two years from the petition date	The Department argued conviction and sentence plus parole prospects supported a firm belief C.L.B. would remain incarcerated at least two years from filing	C.L.B. argued parole likelihood (trustee camp, time credits, pending parole review) made release before the two‑year period reasonably possible, undermining subsection (Q) proof	Court affirmed: evidence was legally and factually sufficient under (b)(1)(Q); parole prospects were speculative and the factfinder could reasonably conclude C.L.B. would remain incarcerated at least two years from filing

Vela v. Marywood, 17 S.W.3d 750 (Tex. App.–Austin 2000) (termination implicates fundamental constitutional rights)
In re J.J., 911 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 1995) (same)
Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1976) (termination requires strict scrutiny)
In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2002) (legal sufficiency standard in termination cases)
In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17 (Tex. 2002) (factual sufficiency standard in termination cases)
In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355 (Tex. 2003) (use of subsection Q when incarceration prevents parent from caring for child)
In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105 (Tex. 2006) (parole evidence is relevant but inherently speculative)