In the Interest of H.C. and H.C., Minor Children D.C., Father, L.A., Mother, 16-1961

Background

Two children (b. 2012 and 2014) were removed from parental custody after injuries to the younger child and parental substance abuse; a sibling born 2016 was not part of these termination rulings.
GAL filed a petition in July 2016 seeking termination of both parents’ rights, initially pleading paragraph (h) (for children three years or younger); the older child had turned four, and the petition was amended to paragraph (f) as to the older child.
The juvenile court allowed the amendment over parents’ timeliness objections, made findings supporting paragraph (f) for the older child and paragraph (h) for the younger child, but the written order mistakenly referenced (h) for the older child (a clerical error).
Mother had a history of substance abuse, delayed engagement in treatment, admitted methamphetamine use as late as June 2016, and had allowed the father (a known risk) in the home despite restrictions.
Father pled guilty to child endangerment related to the 2014 injuries, had ongoing substance abuse, intermittent contact/participation in services, a no-contact order, and a period as a fugitive; he did not present evidence of sobriety or remediation at the termination hearing.
The children were placed with their grandmother and were reported to be adoptable and doing well there; juvenile court and appellate court concluded return to either parent was unsafe at the time of the hearing.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether amendment of petition from §232.116(1)(h) to (f) for the older child was permissible and whether the clerical reference to (h) in the order invalidated termination	Mother: court properly allowed amendment; not disputing amendment	Mother: challenged ruling due to written reference to (h) (typographical error)	Amendment upheld; clerical error excused—court intended (f) and findings support (f) termination
Whether grounds for termination under §232.116(1)(f)/(h) were proven as to mother	Mother: claimed evidence showed some treatment/clean UA tests and could be returned	State: mother’s late treatment, continued substance use, failure to protect children, and history justify inability to return	Held: clear and convincing evidence supports termination under (f) and (h) for mother
Whether grounds for termination under §232.116(1)(f)/(h) were proven as to father	Father: argued no definitive proof he intentionally caused injury and no evidence of current threat or sobriety	State: father’s guilty plea to child endangerment, failure to obtain medical care, ongoing substance abuse, nonparticipation in services, and risk justify termination	Held: clear and convincing evidence supports termination under (f) and (h) for father
Whether termination is contrary to children’s best interests or avoidable under §232.116(3) exceptions (relative placement or parent-child bond)	Parents: argued close parent-child bonds and placement with grandmother weigh against termination	State: permanency and children’s safety outweigh bonds; grandmother’s custody not legal custody; statutory exceptions are permissive	Held: termination is in children’s best interests; statutory exceptions in §232.116(3) do not apply

Key Cases Cited

In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212 (Iowa 2016) (describing three-step termination analysis and de novo review)
In re K.C., 660 N.W.2d 29 (Iowa 2003) (standards for appellate review)
In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703 (Iowa 2010) (permissive exceptions under §232.116(3) and affirming on any single adequate ground)
In re J.C., 857 N.W.2d 495 (Iowa 2014) (children’s best interests are paramount)
State v. Hess, 533 N.W.2d 525 (Iowa 1995) (distinguishing clerical errors from substantive judicial determinations)
State v. Pearson, 876 N.W.2d 200 (Iowa 2016) (nunc pro tunc and clerical error principles)
First Nat’l Bank v. Francis, 342 N.W.2d 468 (Iowa 1984) (recognizing clerical errors occur in judicial opinions)
In re Voeltz, 271 N.W.2d 719 (Iowa 1978) (de novo review need not rehash trial court’s erroneous subsidiary findings)
In re J.S., 846 N.W.2d 36 (Iowa 2014) (standard for adjudicating neglect and risk to children)
In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33 (Iowa 2010) (permanency and inability to delay termination indefinitely)
In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793 (Iowa 2006) (child safety and need for permanent home as central best-interest factors)
In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609 (Iowa 1987) (cannot suspend childhood while parents address problems)
In re D.J.R., 454 N.W.2d 838 (Iowa 1990) (children should not remain in parentless limbo)
In re Kester, 228 N.W.2d 107 (Iowa 1975) (refusing to gamble with children’s future pending parental maturity)
In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489 (Iowa 2000) (statutory time periods for reunification and patience built into scheme)
In re M.W., 458 N.W.2d 847 (Iowa 1990) (legislature’s role in defining when termination promotes child needs)
In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764 (Iowa 2012) (parent’s past performance informs long-range best-interest assessment)
In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100 (Iowa 2014) (§232.116(3) exceptions are permissive and fact-specific)