in the Interest of H.G-J., A.G.-J., & K.G.-J., Children
503 S.W.3d 679
| Tex. App. | 2016Background
- The OAG filed a 2004 Title IV-D suit seeking child support from Father for three children; initial orders set support and conservatorship terms.
- In August 2013 Mother moved to enforce possession; the trial court appointed an amicus attorney for the children and denied habeas corpus orally.
- In October 2013 Father filed to modify conservatorship and requested possession credit; the same amicus was appointed. The OAG appeared and later filed an answer that generally denied allegations and asked the court to confirm any arrearage and appropriate payout.
- At the March 18, 2015 hearing the court awarded the amicus $3,000 in fees ($1,500 each parent) and orally ordered the OAG to disburse $1,287.50 it was holding to pay toward Father’s obligation for the amicus fees; the final written order mirrored this and noted an arrearage of $1,600.41 but did not command payment.
- The OAG appealed, arguing the trial court lacked jurisdiction under Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.002(c) and the separation-of-powers doctrine to compel disbursement, that any such order was an abuse of discretion, and that the court erred by refusing to render a money judgment for arrearage.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court could order the OAG to disburse child support funds to pay amicus fees | OAG: trial court lacked authority; only the Supreme Court may issue mandatory writs against executive officers under Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.002(c) | Father: court’s inherent powers permit such relief; and OAG participated at hearing | Court: order compelling OAG to disburse funds was a mandatory injunction against an executive officer and exceeded trial-court jurisdiction under § 22.002(c); modified judgment to remove the disbursement requirement |
| Whether trial court’s directive was an injunction (prohibited relief) | OAG: the directive was mandatory in nature and thus an injunction | Father: the court’s action flowed from inherent powers to enforce its judgments | Court: the order required specific conduct by the OAG and was therefore a mandatory injunction; section 22.002(c) bars it |
| Whether the court could credit Father for the amount the OAG was ordered to disburse | OAG: court could not order disbursement, so credit based on that disbursement was improper | Father: credit was appropriate because funds were applied | Court: removed both the disbursement requirement and any credit based on that disbursement |
| Whether the trial court erred by not entering a money judgment for arrearage | OAG: under Fam. Code § 157.263(a) court must render cumulative money judgment when enforcement motion requests it | Father: no enforcement motion was properly pled by OAG | Court: OAG’s answer was not a compliant motion for enforcement under § 157.002, so § 157.263 did not require an arrearage judgment; issue overruled |
Key Cases Cited
- A & T Consultants, Inc. v. Sharp, 904 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1995) (district courts lack authority to issue mandamus or injunctions against executive officers absent explicit statutory authorization)
- Qwest Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 24 S.W.3d 334 (Tex. 2000) (character-and-function test for determining whether an order is an injunction)
- Office of the Attorney Gen. of Tex. v. Scholer, 403 S.W.3d 859 (Tex. 2013) (explaining OAG’s statutory role in collecting and distributing child support)
- Burttschell v. Sheppard, 69 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. 1934) (discussing inherent powers of courts to enforce process and judgments)
- In re Office of the Attorney General, 422 S.W.3d 623 (Tex. 2013) (discussing Title IV-D goals and agency role)
- Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at Houston v. Crowder, 349 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011) (following precedent limiting courts’ ability to compel executive officials)