in the Interest of G v. III and G v. Children
543 S.W.3d 342
| Tex. App. | 2017Background
- DFPS filed suit seeking conservatorship and conditional termination of Father’s and Mother’s parental rights after infant Betty suffered non-accidental fractures; children were placed with relatives.
- Temporary orders appointed DFPS as managing conservator; the Joneses later became temporary possessory conservators; visitation was supervised.
- Parents, DFPS, the Joneses, and an intervenor executed a mediated settlement agreement (MSA) that (a) appointed the Joneses as managing conservators, (b) left parental rights intact, (c) limited parents to supervised visitation twice monthly, (d) required $2,000/month combined child support, and (e) included a 48-month moratorium on motions to modify (with an "emergency" exception).
- DFPS moved to enter judgment on the MSA under Tex. Fam. Code §153.0071(e); parents objected and later sought to revoke consent but did not invoke the narrow statutory grounds for setting aside an MSA (§153.0071(e-1)).
- The trial court entered a final order enforcing the MSA under §153.0071, without receiving best-interest evidence; parents appealed arguing §153.0071 should not apply because termination had been pled and remained possible.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Parents) | Defendant's Argument (DFPS) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §153.0071(e) applies when DFPS pled termination and termination was a possibility at mediation | §153.0071 should not apply because the case was a Chapter 161 termination suit (or threatened termination), so parents should be allowed to revoke MSA and court must still assess best interest under §161.001(b)(2) | §153.0071 applies because the MSA did not terminate parental rights and the suit also sought conservatorship under Chapter 153; statute entitles parties to judgment on a compliant MSA except narrow family-violence exception | Court held §153.0071(e) applies; MSA enforceable and trial court properly entered judgment without separate best-interest proof |
| Validity of 48-month moratorium on motions to modify in the MSA | Moratorium unlawfully restricts parents’ right to seek modification | MSA terms are binding under §153.0071 if statutory requirements met | Court found challenge unripe—no live modification suit; did not decide validity on merits |
| Validity of "emergency" prerequisite to file interim motions to modify | "Emergency" condition unlawfully limits ability to seek modification | MSA terms are binding under §153.0071; enforcement question is premature | Court found challenge unripe—issue hypothetical without a filed modification motion |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445 (Tex. 2013) (§153.0071(e) entitles parties to judgment on a statutorily compliant MSA except narrow family-violence exception)
- In re K.D., 471 S.W.3d 147 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015) (MSA and relinquishment may be binding between parties but do not eliminate DFPS’s constitutional burden to prove best interest in termination cases)
- In re Morris, 498 S.W.3d 624 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016) (held §153.0071(e) does not preclude trial court’s best-interest determination in termination cases resulting in termination)
- In re C.T., 491 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. 2016) (emphasizes children’s need for permanency and stability)