In the Interest of Doe
33 A.3d 615
| Pa. | 2011Background
- The Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act allows abortion with informed consent and permits judicial bypass of parental consent for minors who are mature and capable of giving informed consent (3206(c)).
- Appellant Jane Doe, a minor, was about ten weeks pregnant and sought judicial authorization for an abortion without parental consent.
- The trial court denied the petition, citing lack of maturity primarily based on the minor’s failure to obtain parental consent and other factors, including timing and information issues (e.g., delayed receipt of printed materials).
- Superior Court affirmed, and Appellant sought Pennsylvania Supreme Court review on standard of review, parental-consent issue, and trial-court discretion.
- The Supreme Court majority adopts an abuse-of-discretion standard for the maturity/capacity determination, holds parental-consent failure cannot justify denial under 3206(c), and vacates the Superior Court’s ruling.
- The Court acknowledges mootness (the minor was no longer pregnant) but applies a public-importance, repeatable-question exception to review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standard of review for denial of judicial authorization | Appellant urged de novo review for maturity. | Defendant urged abuse of discretion with de novo for legal questions. | Abuse of discretion for maturity; de novo for law; deferential to facts. |
| Parental consent requirement under 3206(c) | Minor has right not to involve parents; lack of consent should not bar bypass. | Court may consider parental-consent issues in determining maturity. | Parental-consent failure cannot be the basis to deny judicial authorization. |
| Use of failure to seek parental consent in the maturity finding | Court may consider reasons for not seeking consent as part of maturity assessment. | Failure to seek consent can reflect on maturity and capacity. | Trial court abused discretion when relying on lack of parental consent as sole ground for immaturity. |
| Mootness and public-interest exception | Case moot since pregnancy ended; no live controversy. | Public-interest issues may still be addressed. | Case deemed moot but qualifies for exception due to public importance and likely repetition. |
Key Cases Cited
- Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (U.S. 1973) (right to abortion before viability)
- Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (U.S. 1992) (undue burden framework for abortion regulation)
- Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (U.S. 1979) (parental consent and judicial bypass concept in minors')
- Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (U.S. 1976) (no blanket parental-consent veto over a minor's abortion)
- In re L.D.F., 820 A.2d 714 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (abuse of discretion standard in absence of statutory guidance)
- Commonwealth v. Omar, 981 A.2d 179 (Pa. 2009) (de novo vs. deferential review considerations in pure questions of law)
- In re Adoption of J.J., 515 A.2d 886 (Pa. 1986) (abuse of discretion standard in guardianship/parental-rights contexts)
- In re Peery, 727 A.2d 589 (Pa. 1999) (abuse of discretion in guardianship-related determinations)
- Charles v. Stehlik, 744 A.2d 1255 (Pa. 2000) (custody review requires deference to trial court findings absent abuse)
- Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (U.S. 1984) (independent record review in First Amendment false-statement cases; cited for independent-review principle)