In the Interest of D.W., a Child, 353 S.W.3d 188

Della appeals the termination of her parental rights to her three-year-old son D.W.; she challenges trial on the grounds of new trial denial, continuance denial, and severance, and argues insufficient evidence.
The record shows Della has extremely low intellectual functioning, likely preventing effective parenting beyond basic physical care.
Della repeatedly failed to maintain contact with CPS after D.W. entered state custody and largely stopped visiting during the proceedings, moving eight times in total.
Della surrendered D.W. to others following a medical emergency after her ex-boyfriend claimed the child suffered from sickle cell anemia, a claim later shown to be false.
CPS offered services (parenting classes, counseling), but Della attended inconsistently and largely ceased participation after early 2010; the last visit with D.W. occurred in August 2010.
The trial court ultimately severed Della’s case from the biological father’s case and proceeded to terminate Della’s parental rights.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Motion for new trial denial	Della, not present at trial, lacked actual notice; counsel failed to locate her.	Notice to counsel suffices; party appeared through counsel and Rule 8/245 compliance.	No abuse of discretion; denial affirmed.
Motion for continuance denial	Continuance needed due to inability to locate Della and vital need for her presence.	Party bears responsibility to be accessible; continuance improperly delays statutory timetable.	No abuse of discretion; denial affirmed.
Severance of the mother's case from the father's case	Severance prejudiced the mother and undermined adoption goals by prematurely terminating her rights.	Severance appropriate given unknown father, time constraints, and adoption goals; served interests of justice and efficiency.	Not an abuse of discretion; severance affirmed.
Sufficiency of evidence for termination	Evidence insufficient to prove termination under § 161.001(1)(N) or best interest under Holley.	Clear and convincing evidence shows constructive abandonment, inability to provide a safe environment, and best interests support termination.	Evidence legally and factually sufficient; termination affirmed.

Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc. v. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d 922 (Tex. 2009) (trial court’s discretionary rulings on new trials generally reviewed for abuse)
In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010) (appeal of termination issues in juvenile proceedings)
In re A.D.A., 287 S.W.3d 382 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009) (notice and continuance considerations in family cases)
Vela v. Sharp, 395 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1965) (notice requirements and appearance through counsel)
Withrow v. Schou, 13 S.W.3d 37 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999) (communication with represented parties allowable through counsel)
Magana v. Magana, 576 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 1978) (attorney knowledge imputed to client for trial notices)
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (U.S. Supreme Court, 1982) (parens patriae and fundamental liberty interest in parental termination)
In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2002) (clear and convincing standard for termination; Holley framework)
In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17 (Tex. 2002) (necessity of clear and convincing evidence in termination)
In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355 (Tex. 2003) (one ground may support termination when coupled with best interest)
Holly v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. 1976) (Holley factors for best-interest determination)
J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. 2009) (Holley framework and best-interest standard in termination)