in the Interest of B. C. S., a Child, 479 S.W.3d 918

Father, a military veteran with a service-related traumatic brain injury, was the child's custodial parent after mother’s incarceration; family lived in Texas while Father was stationed at Fort Bliss.
CPS removed B.C.S. (born 2007) after reports of domestic violence and multiple safety-plan violations; the child was placed in foster care and later moved to Massachusetts to live with paternal great-aunt and uncle (the Cunninghams) after an ICPC placement.
The Cunninghams provided stability and wanted to adopt the child but conditions made their willingness to keep the child contingent on termination of Father’s parental rights.
Father had a history of domestic incidents (some prosecuted) and anger-management issues stemming from a traumatic brain injury; he obtained treatment but was later incarcerated at time of trial (length/charges not proved).
The Department petitioned to terminate Father’s rights under Tex. Fam. Code §161.001(1)(A),(B),(D),(E),(N); trial court found multiple statutory grounds and that termination was in the child’s best interest.
The court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding the evidence insufficient on the best-interest finding despite upholding that statutory endangerment grounds were supported.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of statutory predicates for termination (D/E/N/A/B)	Dept. argued Father’s and household violence, safety-plan violations, and lack of suitable contact/support satisfied statutory grounds for termination.	Father did not contest endangerment findings in detail; argued termination was mainly based on incarceration and claimed some predicates were improperly applied.	Court accepted that evidence supported the statutory endangerment predicates (D/E) and related grounds.
Best interest of the child	Dept. and CASA argued termination promoted permanency and stability (Cunninghams’ placement and adoption plan).	Father argued child loved him, wanted to be with him, Father sought services and placement with grandmother was possible; Dept. failed to prove incarceration length or inability to reunify.	Court held evidence was factually insufficient to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the child’s best interest and reversed/remanded.
Ineffective assistance of counsel	Dept./trial record implied counsel was adequate; CASA favored termination.	Father claimed ineffective assistance at trial.	Court did not reach this issue because it reversed on best-interest insufficiency.

Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. 1985) (parental rights are constitutionally protected but not absolute)
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (U.S. 1982) (termination requires heightened proof; due process)
In the Interest of M.S., E.S., D.S., S.S., and N.S., 115 S.W.3d 534 (Tex. 2003) (parental custody interest is paramount; termination is traumatic and permanent)
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (U.S. 2000) (recognition of parental liberty interest in childrearing)
In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2002) (standard for reviewing factual sufficiency under clear-and-convincing evidence)
In the Interest of J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570 (Tex. 2005) (standards for legal-sufficiency review in termination cases)