In the Interest of A.K.
2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 1537
Tex. App.2016Background
- In Aug–Nov 2014, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services investigated repeated injuries to A.K., a toddler in Father's custody; photos and hospital exam showed bruises, lacerations, bite marks, bald spots, and other wounds. Father attributed injuries to tantrums or accidents; medical expert deemed them nonaccidental and non‑self‑inflicted.
- Father lived with his girlfriend (“Ronda”), who was the child’s primary caretaker; investigators arrested Father and Ronda for injury to a child after the hospital referral.
- The Department obtained emergency custody and the associate judge entered temporary orders finding "aggravated circumstances," waiving services and accelerating trial; Father sought and received de novo review but the temporary findings remained in the record.
- At the final hearing the associate judge (and later the district court on de novo review) found grounds for termination under Tex. Fam. Code §161.001(b)(1)(D),(E) and concluded termination was in the child’s best interest; Father appealed.
- Father’s appellate complaints: (1) aggravated‑circumstances finding in the temporary orders was based on preponderance rather than clear and convincing proof; (2) that finding deprived him of due process by waiving services and accelerating the case; and (3) the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the best‑interest finding.
Issues
| Issue | Father’s Argument | Department’s / Trial Court’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of aggravated‑circumstances finding in temporary orders (standard of proof) | Temporary finding used preponderance, not clear and convincing, so it was improper | The temporary finding was entered but temporary orders are superseded by the final termination order and thus moot on appeal | Moot — complaints about aggravated circumstances in temporary orders are not reviewable on appeal from a final termination order |
| Due process (waiver of services, expedited trial) | Aggravated‑circumstances finding deprived Father of service plan, reunification efforts, and adequate process | Same as above; temporary orders governed pretrial but final termination supersedes them; Father also stated "no objection" at trial to admission of those orders (waiver argument) | Moot / waived — appellate review of due‑process complaint about temporary orders declined |
| Sufficiency of evidence that termination is in child's best interest | Termination not justified; father points to disputed inferences about cause of injuries | Evidence (medical testimony, photos, investigator testimony, child’s fear, stability of relative placement, father’s refusal to acknowledge cause and intent to remain with Ronda) supports best‑interest finding | Affirmed — evidence (direct, circumstantial, Holley factors) legally and factually sufficient under clear and convincing standard to permit a reasonable factfinder to form a firm belief that termination was in A.K.’s best interest |
Key Cases Cited
- In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. 2009) (clear‑and‑convincing standard required for termination findings)
- In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570 (Tex. 2005) (appellate review asks whether factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction)
- In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2002) (standards for legal and factual sufficiency in termination cases)
- Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. 1976) (Holley factors for best‑interest analysis)
- In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17 (Tex. 2002) (evidence supporting statutory grounds can also be probative of best interest)
- In re L.M.I., 119 S.W.3d 707 (Tex. 2003) (deference to trial‑court fact findings and warning against appellate reweighing of credibility)
- In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112 (Tex. 2006) (presumption that maintaining parent‑child relationship is in child’s best interest, balanced against the need for timely placement in a safe environment)