In the Interest of A.D.
93 A.3d 888
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2014Background
- Father (D.R.D., II) had been subject to a Texas finding ("reasons to believe") of sexual abuse of one child (A.D.); the family moved from Texas to Pennsylvania in violation of a Texas safety plan that barred Father from contact with the children.
- Franklin County CYS placed the three children (ages 8, 7, and 2 at termination) in foster care and adjudicated them dependent; Father returned to Texas and faces pending criminal charges for sexual abuse.
- CYS petitioned to terminate both parents’ rights; after CYS’s case-in-chief the court dismissed the petition as to Mother for insufficiency but permitted the petition against Father to proceed; Father moved to recuse the trial judge and declined to present evidence at trial, in part because of the court’s in‑chambers remarks.
- The court terminated Father’s parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) and (b), finding Father incapable of providing essential parental care due to the no‑contact order entered for the children’s protection and that termination served the children’s needs and welfare.
- Father appealed arguing (1) the termination lacked clear-and-convincing evidence and (2) the court abused its discretion by denying the recusal motion; the Superior Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Father’s Argument | CYS/Trial Court’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trial judge recusation | Court’s in‑chambers remarks showed bias and predecided Father’s case; thus judge should recuse | Remarks merely addressed sufficiency of CYS’s case against Mother; judge did not preclude Father’s evidence and properly refused recusal for judicial‑economy reasons | Denial of recusal affirmed — Father failed to produce evidence of bias raising substantial doubt about impartiality |
| § 2511(a)(2): grounds for termination where no‑contact order prevents parent contact | No‑contact order and denial of reunification services prevented Father from demonstrating parental fitness; termination improper without ability to remediate | No‑contact order (entered to protect children from sexual abuse) rendered Father unable to provide essential parental care; like incarceration, it is relevant and can be dispositive under § 2511(a)(2) | Termination under § 2511(a)(2) upheld — Father’s incapacity (and its causes) cannot be remedied while no‑contact order remains |
| § 2511(b): children’s needs and welfare / parent-child bond | Lack of evidence of a bond (partly because of the no‑contact order) means court could not properly assess harm from severance | Court may weigh safety, attachment to foster parents, stability, and developmental needs; existing therapeutic and foster‑home evidence showed termination served children’s best interests | § 2511(b) affirmed — severance consistent with children’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs |
| Agency’s failure to provide reunification services | CYS’s refusal to provide Father reunification services (because of safety/no‑contact order) undermines fairness and the termination decision | Adequacy of agency reunification efforts is not a defense to termination; parent’s conduct is the focus | Rejection — agency’s omission is not a basis to overturn termination; focus remains on parent conduct and children’s welfare |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Geiger, 331 A.2d 172 (Pa. 1975) (framework for § 2511(a)(2): repeated incapacity/abuse, resulting lack of essential parental care, and inability or unwillingness to remedy causes)
- In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380 (Pa. Super. 2004) (termination focus is parent conduct; adequacy of agency reunification efforts is not a valid defense)
- In re R.C., 945 A.2d 182 (Pa. Super. 2008) (no‑contact orders cannot be used to show a parent failed to contact child; distinguishable on facts)
- In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817 (Pa. 2012) (incarceration can be a determinative factor under § 2511(a)(2); length and effect of confinement relevant)
- In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326 (Pa. Super. 2002) (§ 2511(a)(2) not limited to affirmative misconduct; includes incapacity or refusal)
- In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529 (Pa. Super. 2008) (parental bond is only one part of § 2511(b); court may balance bond against parent’s inability to meet child’s needs)
- In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753 (Pa. Super. 2008) (court may emphasize safety needs, attachment to foster family, and continuity of beneficial relationships in § 2511(b) analysis)
- In re T.D., 949 A.2d 910 (Pa. Super. 2008) (strong emotional bond does not automatically preclude termination where parent cannot meet child’s needs)