in the Interest of A.L.R., a Child, 11-20-00294-CV

Background

Child A.L.R. was removed from her parents shortly after birth; the Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) became permanent managing conservator and later sought termination.
The mother voluntarily relinquished parental rights; the father (Appellant) was convicted of felony assault-family-violence, sentenced to five years, and incarcerated.
A court-ordered family service plan (signed by Appellant) required stable housing and income, parenting classes, psychological evaluation, visitation, abstention from criminal activity and drugs, among other tasks; many items in the plan were phrased as "The Department requests…" but the plan was adopted as a court order.
The Department presented evidence that Appellant failed to comply with the service plan (e.g., no stable housing or income, discharged from parenting classes for aggression, ongoing mental-health and violence concerns).
A.L.R. had lived in a kinship foster placement for about 2.5 years, was bonded to the foster family, and the foster parents were licensed to adopt; the Department recommended termination and adoption by the foster parents.
The trial court found two statutory grounds for termination under Tex. Fam. Code §161.001(b)(1)(O) and (Q) and that termination was in the child’s best interest; the father appealed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the service plan was sufficiently specific to support termination under §161.001(b)(1)(O)	Appellant argued the plan used permissive language ("The Department requests…") and thus lacked the required specificity to be an enforceable court-ordered set of actions.	Department argued the service plan was incorporated into the court order, the trial court told Appellant the plan required compliance, and Appellant understood and signed it.	Court held the combined court order and plan imposed enforceable requirements; evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support (O).
Whether evidence supported finding under §161.001(b)(1)(Q) that Appellant would remain confined two or more years after the petition filing	Appellant challenged sufficiency of evidence relating to the two-year incarceration finding.	Department presented Appellant's felony conviction and imprisonment as evidence of prolonged inability to care for the child.	Court did not address (Q) because (O) alone supported termination; (Q) challenge was rendered unnecessary.
Whether termination is in the child’s best interest	Appellant argued the Department failed to present evidence on many Holley factors and lacked specific proof termination was best for the child.	Department relied on Holley factors: child’s long-term placement and bond with foster family, Appellant’s instability, mental-health issues, history of family violence, and the foster parents’ ability and plan to adopt.	Court held evidence (Holley factors + statutory ground) was legally and factually sufficient to find termination served the child’s best interest.

Key Cases Cited

In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498 (Tex. 2014) (standards for legal and factual sufficiency in termination appeals)
In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570 (Tex. 2005) (legal-sufficiency review in parental-termination cases)
In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17 (Tex. 2002) (factual-sufficiency review and deference to factfinder)
Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. 1976) (non-exhaustive factors for determining child’s best interest)
In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239 (Tex. 2013) ("abuse or neglect" includes substantial risk from the child’s environment)
In re Z.M.M., 577 S.W.3d 541 (Tex. 2019) (courts must consider §161.001(d) impossibility/good-faith defense to (O) findings)
In re L.G., 596 S.W.3d 778 (Tex. 2020) (upholding termination under subsection (O))
In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2002) (standard for when disputed evidence is so significant a factfinder could not form a firm belief)