in the Interest of A.L.M.-f., A.M., J.A.-f., N.A.-f., and E.A.-f., Children
593 S.W.3d 271
| Tex. | 2019Background
- DFPS sought termination of Mother's parental rights to five children; trial court referred the case to an associate judge without objection and the parties waived a jury trial before the associate judge.
- After a two-day bench trial, the associate judge found grounds for termination and that termination was in the children’s best interests.
- Mother timely requested a de novo hearing before the referring court and, for the first time, demanded a jury trial at that de novo stage.
- The Department and the children’s attorney ad litem opposed a jury at the de novo hearing, citing prejudice, expense, witness-recall difficulties, and harm from delayed permanency for the children.
- The referring court denied Mother’s jury demand, conducted a non‑evidentiary de novo hearing (relying on the associate-judge record), and later terminated Mother’s rights; the court of appeals affirmed.
- The Texas Supreme Court considered whether section 201.015 of the Family Code entitles a party who waived a jury before an associate judge to demand a jury for the first time at a de novo hearing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a party may demand a first-time jury trial at a de novo hearing under Tex. Fam. Code §201.015 | Mother: §201.015’s “de novo” label and prohibition on a “second” jury imply a right to a first jury at de novo | State/Dept.: §201.015 is silent about a right to a jury; it permits but does not require a referring court to grant a jury in its discretion | Court: No statutory right; referring court may, in its discretion, grant a first-time jury at a de novo hearing |
| Whether the de novo hearing is equivalent to a trial de novo that vacates the associate-judge judgment | Mother: de novo means a new, independent trial allowing jury on demand | Dept.: de novo hearing is limited, expedited, and not a full trial de novo | Court: de novo hearing under Ch.201 is not a trial de novo; it is an extension of the original proceeding with limited scope |
| Whether timing/deadlines in §201.015 require courts to grant a jury on short notice | Mother: a jury could theoretically be set in the statutory timeframe; therefore right exists | Dept.: 3-day request window and 30-day hearing deadline make mandatory jury settings impracticable and disruptive | Court: timelines are incompatible with a presumptive right to a jury; statute’s structure supports discretion not entitlement |
| Whether the Texas Constitution requires more jury protection than the statute provides | Mother: Texas Const. guarantees an inviolate jury right warranting a jury at de novo | Dept.: statute already affords robust jury options earlier; Mother voluntarily waived available jury remedies | Court: No constitutional deficiency shown; statute provides adequate jury protections and Mother waived them |
Key Cases Cited
- Sommers v. Sandcastle Homes, Inc., 521 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. 2017) (statutory-construction principles — read statute as cohesive whole)
- Spradlin v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 34 S.W.3d 578 (Tex. 2000) (statutory interpretation—presume legislative word choice deliberate)
- Key W. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Ins., 350 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. 1961) (definition and attributes of a "trial de novo")
- Lone Star Gas Co. v. State, 153 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1941) (trial de novo requires full civil trial on facts and law)
- Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. v. Rhyne, 925 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. 1996) (abuse-of-discretion standard for jury-demand rulings)
- Halsell v. Dehoyos, 810 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. 1991) (presumptive reasonableness of timely jury demand under rule 216)
- Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (U.S. 1982) (parental rights are fundamental liberty interests)
- In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340 (Tex. 2003) (statutory mandate for judicial economy and expedited handling in termination cases)