In the Int. of: A.A., a Minor Appeal of: A.A.
149 A.3d 354
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2016Background
- On Jan. 9, 2015 Sgt. Still stopped a sedan for expired registration; driver was A.A., a 17‑year‑old.
- During the stop A.A. appeared confused and sluggish; passenger Kyle Lewis made furtive movements and briefly opened the passenger door.
- While processing paperwork, Sgt. Still smelled marijuana coming from the vehicle. He returned documents, told A.A. “good night,” but then re‑engaged her and asked if there was anything illegal in the car.
- Lewis volunteered there was a marijuana pipe; A.A. offered to let the officer search. After A.A. exited the vehicle officer observed a pill on the driver’s seat; a subsequent search recovered marijuana residue, a pill (Klonopin) and a pipe; Lewis had a BB gun on his person.
- A.A. failed field sobriety tests and was arrested; charged in juvenile court with DUI (impairment and controlled substance), possession of a controlled substance, possession of paraphernalia, and traffic offenses.
- A.A. moved to suppress evidence as the product of an illegal second detention; the juvenile court denied suppression and adjudicated her delinquent. A.A. appealed the denial of the suppression motion; the Superior Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Appellant's Argument | Commonwealth's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether officer’s re‑engagement after saying “good night” was an illegal second detention lacking reasonable suspicion | Re‑engagement constituted a new investigative detention; under Nguyen (and earlier panel precedent) officer needed new, independent reasonable suspicion arising after the stop ended; none existed | The totality of the circumstances (including observations made during the lawful stop) may be used to evaluate reasonable suspicion for continued detention; Kemp (en banc) permits reliance on facts gathered during the initial stop | The encounter was a second investigative detention but was supported by reasonable suspicion based on combined observations (A.A.’s sluggishness, passenger’s furtive movements, odor of marijuana); suppression denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Kemp, 961 A.2d 1247 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc) (overruled prior panel rule that facts from initial stop are erased after officer says person is free to go; totality‑of‑circumstances including facts from the stop may justify continued detention)
- Commonwealth v. Cook, 735 A.2d 673 (Pa. 1999) (defines reasonable suspicion standard for investigative detentions)
- Commonwealth v. Mistler, 912 A.2d 1265 (Pa. 2006) (standards for appellate review of suppression rulings)
- Commonwealth v. Nguyen, 116 A.3d 657 (Pa. Super. 2015) (panel decision relied on by appellant; limited‑facts approach to post‑stop detention analysis but not followed where Kemp controls)
- Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108 (Pa. Super. 2005) (discusses characterization of further questioning as detention when stop’s purpose has ended)
- Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 786 A.2d 261 (Pa. Super. 2001) (panel decision held facts from stop could not justify continued detention after free‑to‑go language; later overruled by Kemp)
- Commonwealth v. Johnson, 833 A.2d 755 (Pa. Super. 2003) (applied Ortiz; similarly limited and later abrogated by Kemp)
- Commonwealth v. Freeman, 757 A.2d 903 (Pa. 2000) (Supreme Court precedent on need for reasonable suspicion independent of the traffic violation to justify extended detention)
- United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (U.S. 2002) (totality‑of‑circumstances framework for reasonable suspicion determinations)
- Commonwealth v. Rogers, 849 A.2d 1185 (Pa. 2004) (reiterates totality‑of‑circumstances approach for reasonable suspicion)