in the Guardianship of Ruby Peterson
01-15-00567-CV
Tex. App.Dec 14, 2015Background
- Plaintiffs (Ruby Peterson’s children and next friends) filed state‑court tort claims and sought emergency injunctive relief alleging Silverado Senior Living and others unlawfully confined and over‑medicated Ruby and violated residents’ statutory and constitutional rights. Plaintiffs also filed (and later nonsuited) a guardianship application; competing filings and counsel statements led to transfer of the tort case to probate.
- Extensive evidence (videos, medical records, and live testimony at a multi‑day temporary injunction hearing) is alleged to show Ruby asked to leave Silverado, was restrained/over‑medicated, and was denied family visits and phone/mail access.
- Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims (including via Texas Rule 91a and pleas to jurisdiction/abatement) and separately moved for sanctions against attorney Candice Schwager and plaintiffs. Some claims were dismissed and sanctions were awarded; plaintiffs seek modification/reversal based on new evidence and procedural/constitutional arguments.
- Plaintiffs contend a Rule 11 agreement executed during the litigation is void (duress, illegality, fraudulent inducement) and did not divest them of standing; they allege defendants used false statements and hearsay to obtain dismissal and sanctions.
- Central legal themes: validity/effect of Rule 11 agreement and standing; propriety of Rule 91a dismissals and pleas/abatement; whether sanctions under Tex. R. Civ. P. 10/13 (and disciplinary rules like 3.07) were appropriate; and First Amendment/Article I, §8 limits on gag orders and pretrial restraints on speech.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity/effect of Rule 11 agreement and standing | Rule 11 is void for illegality, duress, lack of consideration, and fraudulent inducement; thus plaintiffs retained standing and dismissals based on the agreement are invalid | Defendants rely on the Rule 11 to show plaintiffs lacked standing and to support dismissal | Plaintiffs move to modify/reverse prior orders; record reflects disagreement over Rule 11’s validity (motion seeks relief; appellate posture noted but no final appellate ruling stated in this motion) |
| Rule 91a dismissal / pleadings sufficiency | Plaintiffs assert claims for assault/battery, false imprisonment, conspiracy, fiduciary breach were supported by affidavits, testimony, videos and thus not frivolous or subject to Rule 91a dismissal | Defendants argued claims were legally baseless or plaintiffs lacked standing, justifying Rule 91a dismissal | Plaintiffs argue dismissal was improper given the evidence presented at injunction hearing; motion asks court to reinstate claims (no final decision text provided here) |
| Sanctions (Rules 10, 13, disciplinary rules incl. 3.07) | Sanctions against Schwager and plaintiffs were unsupported: no bad‑faith, no objective proof of frivolous filings, and sanctions relied on inadmissible hearsay and constitutionally protected speech | Defendants contend sanctions were warranted for frivolous pleadings, procedural abuses, and improper extrajudicial statements | Plaintiffs seek rescission of sanctions, arguing trial court failed to make required particularized findings and violated due process; the motion requests modification of sanctions orders (prior sanctions were affirmed on Jan. 9, 2015 per motion text) |
| Prior restraint / First Amendment (gag orders, pretrial publicity) | Schwager’s blogging and video dissemination is protected core political/speech on matters of public concern; trial judge declined to enter gag order at hearing and plaintiffs relied on that representation; any restrictions would be an unconstitutional prior restraint under Texas Constitution/First Amendment | Defendants sought restrictions on dissemination of videos and publicity, citing privacy and potential prejudice to proceedings | Plaintiffs invoke Davenport v. Garcia and federal First Amendment law to argue gag/prior restraints are disfavored and that prior judicial statements gave Schwager a green light to continue public commentary; motion contends any sanctions for speech violate constitutional standards |
Key Cases Cited
- City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (U.S. 1982) (discussing limits on state action affecting speech and related constitutional principles)
- Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. 1992) (Texas Supreme Court standard for gag orders in civil proceedings: imminent/irreparable harm to judicial process and least‑restrictive means)
- Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (U.S. 1991) (standards governing professional discipline for lawyers’ extrajudicial statements)
- New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (U.S. 1964) (First Amendment protection for public‑issue speech and standards for defamatory claims)
- Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (U.S. 1976) (treatment of prior restraints and gag orders under the First Amendment)
