in the Estate of Johnnie Mae King
04-15-00271-CV
Tex. App.Oct 15, 2015Background
- Appellant Rowland J. Martin, as administrator of the Estate of Johnnie Mae King, filed an unopposed motion to abate appellate proceedings and for leave to file a second amended brief to pursue ancillary probate administration and claims against attorney Edward Bravenec and his firm.
- Core dispute centers on competing interests in real property (notably 1216 West Ave. and 951 Lombrano, San Antonio) arising from liens, deeds of trust, lis pendens filings, and alleged conversion of purchase-money/security interests during 2003–2006 transactions tied to Moroco Ventures, LLC.
- Martin asserts a third-party purchase-money vendor’s lien and an administrator’s Class 2 lien (Estates Code §355.066(b)) to protect funds and services he claims were expended on behalf of the estate; he re-recorded lien notices and lis pendens to preserve those claims.
- Martin alleges Bravenec intentionally abandoned the probate representation, prosecuted litigation and motions (including lis pendens expunction and Rule 11/revocation proceedings) that harmed the estate, and converted in-kind compensation tied to the property into unearned benefits.
- The Fifth Circuit (in Martin v. Bravenec) affirmed summary judgment but vacated and remanded the district court’s Rule 11 monetary sanctions/fee award as an abuse of discretion and for due-process defects; that opinion is cited by Martin to support reopening probate/ancillary proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether appellate proceedings should be abated to permit supplemental probate/ancillary proceedings | Martin: abatement is warranted and unopposed; allows supplementation of record and judicial economy | Bexar appraisal authorities: no opposition to abatement as to trespass-to-chattels claim; otherwise not opposed | Martin moved to abate; motion presented as unopposed on specified issues (procedural outcome dependent on appellate court disposition) |
| Whether SAAF (San Antonio Area Found. v. Lang / Probate Code §58(c)) supports treating promissory/notes/choses in action as personal property and justifies probate administration to pursue tort/turnover claims | Martin: SAAF’s construction of personal vs. real property supports that the estate’s choses in action (promissory notes, profit interests) are personal property and that administration is needed to pursue interference/trespass-to-chattel claims against Bravenec | Bravenec: (implicit) disputes characterization and causal liability arising from prior litigation tactics | Court: SAAF controls definition of real vs. personal property; Martin relies on that authority to justify further probate administration (court evaluating abatement/leave to amend) |
| Whether Bravenec’s lis pendens filings, litigation tactics, and subsequent actions support liability (trespass to chattels / interference with estate administration) | Martin: Bravenec intentionally interfered with estate property rights, converted purchase-money interests into unearned compensation, and pursued meritless litigation to delay/harass the estate | Bravenec: defended filings as litigious conduct protected by judicial process; sought Rule 11 sanctions against Martin | Fifth Circuit found district court abused discretion and denied due process in awarding Rule 11 fees against Martin; that decision undermines parts of the sanctions against Martin and is invoked by Martin to challenge prior rulings and pursue liability against Bravenec |
| Priority/validity of third-party purchase-money vendor’s lien and administrator’s Class 2 lien vs. liens acquired/foreclosed by Bravenec or his assignees | Martin: his recorded purchase-money lien and administrator’s Class 2 lien have priority/protective effect and justify relief (turnover/quiet title) | Opposing lienholders/assignees: rely on deed-of-trust foreclosures and chain-of-title transfers to assert superior title | Martin asserts contractual and equitable bases for priority (resulting trust/purchase-money lien) and cites case law supporting enforcement; factual determination reserved for probate/ancillary courts |
Key Cases Cited
- Chate Garza Investments, Inc. v. Madaria, 931 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996) (absolute privilege for lis pendens filings)
- McKaskey v. McCall, 236 S.W. 432 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1920) (lis pendens expunction on defective rationale is fundamental error)
- Erwin v. Steele, 228 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1950) (distinction between real and personal property ownership principles)
- Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U.S. 45 (1875) (rule that parties must honor contracts and cannot avoid obligations by professed ignorance)
- Thomson v. Locke, 1 S.W. 112 (Tex. 1886) (quiet title purpose: remove unlawful hindrances to legal title)
- Johnson v. Wood, 157 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. 1941) (equitable principles enforcing purchase-money and related interests)
- Flanagan v. Cushman, 48 Tex. 241 (Tex. 1877) (historical authority on third-party purchase money lien principles)