In the Estate of Freebairn
2015 Mo. App. LEXIS 1123
| Mo. Ct. App. | 2015Background
- Appellant Elizabeth St. John (daughter) petitioned to remove co-guardians Gay Norris and Margaret Norris, Ph.D., who were appointed for her incapacitated mother (the Ward).
- Guardianship and conservatorship were initially established (2010); court found the Ward totally incapacitated and authorized various estate expenditures, sales, and an irrevocable special needs trust.
- Appellant alleged the guardians restricted her visitation and asserted the Ward’s estate had no assets.
- Respondents moved to dismiss for lack of standing under the probate code, arguing Appellant was not an “interested person” as defined by Section 472.010(15).
- The probate court granted the motion; the appellate majority affirmed dismissal, holding Appellant lacked the required financial interest in the estate.
- A dissent argued statutory text and other guardianship provisions show adult children should have standing in guardianship proceedings despite lack of financial interest.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Appellant has standing to seek removal of guardians | As the Ward’s child, Appellant has a natural, familial interest and thus is an “interested person” entitled to pursue removal | Appellant is not an “interested person” under §472.010(15) because she has no financial/property interest in the Ward’s estate | Held: Appellant lacks standing; dismissal affirmed (no financial interest = not an interested person) |
| Whether “interested person” includes nonfinancial filial interests in guardianship context | Filial interest in Ward's welfare suffices for standing in guardianship matters | Statutory definition limits interested persons to those with financial interests; courts should not extend it to sentimental interests | Held: Courts construe statute narrowly; sentimental/filial interest is insufficient for standing |
| Whether guardianship statutes (Ch. 475) alter standing analysis from probate estate rules | Guardianship provisions (e.g., notice to adult children, preference for appointment of relatives) imply children have standing | The probate-code definition controls and equates guardianships to estates unless inconsistent; prior precedent restricts standing to financial interest | Held: Precedent controls; guardianship provisions do not expand §472.010(15) to confer standing absent financial interest |
| Whether appellate courts should revisit precedent equating guardianships to decedent estates | Appellant urges broader view recognizing family interests in custody/care matters | Respondents rely on existing precedent and statutory text; any change is for the Legislature | Held: Court follows precedent (R.C.H., Juppier); legislative change recommended but not adopted by court |
Key Cases Cited
- In re R.C.H., 419 S.W.3d 158 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013) (courts reluctant to extend "interested person" to nonfinancial filial interests)
- Estate of Whittaker, 261 S.W.3d 615 (Mo. App. E.D. 2008) (standing is threshold jurisdictional issue in probate appeals)
- In re Estate of Juppier, 81 S.W.3d 699 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002) (definition of interested person limited to those with financial interest)
- Estate of Davis, 954 S.W.2d 374 (Mo. App. E.D. 1997) (probate-code aggrieved parties entitled to appeal)