In re X.R., 21-0193

DHHR filed an abuse and neglect petition (Mar. 2020) after petitioner H.W. allegedly used methamphetamine while pregnant; X.R. was born drug-exposed and required two months of hospital detoxification.
H.W. was incarcerated around the child’s birth and had prior involuntary terminations of parental rights to two biological children and two stepchildren in 2016 for substance abuse and failure to comply with services.
H.W. stipulated to abuse/neglect at adjudication (Sept. 2020). DHHR moved to terminate parental rights (Nov. 2020); H.W. sought a post-adjudicatory improvement period after release on parole and placement in a sober living facility.
At disposition (Jan. 2021) the caseworker acknowledged recent progress but recommended termination because statutory permanency timeframes would be exceeded before reunification could realistically occur.
The circuit court denied the improvement period and terminated H.W.’s parental rights (Feb. 16, 2021), finding aggravated circumstances, no reasonable likelihood of correction in the near future, and that termination was necessary for the child’s welfare.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (H.W.)	Defendant's Argument (DHHR)	Held
Whether the court erred by denying a post-adjudicatory improvement period	H.W. argued she had been sober, engaged in services in jail and the sober living program, attended meetings, and would comply with an improvement period	DHHR argued prior involuntary terminations, chronic substance abuse, and that any improvement period would push permanency beyond statutory timelines	Denial affirmed: court did not abuse discretion; historical failure and statutory time limits supported denial
Whether termination of parental rights (vs. less-restrictive alternative) was proper	H.W. argued recent progress justified a less-restrictive alternative and potential reunification	DHHR argued no reasonable likelihood of near-future correction given history and need for child permanency	Termination affirmed: statute permits termination where no reasonable likelihood conditions can be corrected and child’s welfare requires permanency

In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011) (standard of review and permanency timing requirements)
In Interest of Tiffany Marie S., 196 W. Va. 223, 470 S.E.2d 177 (1996) (bench‑trial findings of fact reviewed for clear error)
In re M.M., 236 W. Va. 108, 778 S.E.2d 338 (2015) (circuit court discretion to grant improvement periods)
In re Charity H., 215 W. Va. 208, 599 S.E.2d 631 (2004) (termination may proceed without improvement period if parent cannot correct conditions in near future)
In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 443, 573 S.E.2d 354 (2002) (court may refuse improvement period when no improvement likely)
In re Kyiah P., 213 W. Va. 424, 582 S.E.2d 871 (2003) (reduced threshold for termination when parent previously lost parental rights)
In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980) (termination may be used without less-restrictive alternatives when no reasonable likelihood of correction)
In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011) (reaffirming standards for termination and alternatives)
State v. Michael M., 202 W. Va. 350, 504 S.E.2d 177 (1998) (priority for securing a suitable adoptive home in permanency determinations)
James M. v. Maynard, 185 W. Va. 648, 408 S.E.2d 400 (1991) (guardian ad litem role continues until permanent placement)