In re Wight Manning, 147 A.3d 645

In 2001 petitioner pled guilty to third-offense DUI (DUI-3) after a change-of-plea hearing; the transcript does not include reading of elements, an explicit factual recital by the State, or an explicit admission by petitioner that he was intoxicated while driving.
In 2014 petitioner was convicted and sentenced for fourth-offense DUI (DUI-4), a sentence enhanced by the 2001 DUI-3 conviction; petitioner filed a post-conviction relief (PCR) petition challenging the sufficiency of the 2001 plea colloquy under V.R.Cr.P. 11(d) and 11(f).
The PCR court ruled for the State, finding the 2001 colloquy supplied an implicit factual basis and that the plea was voluntary; it also questioned timeliness but held the petition procedurally viable.
On appeal the Supreme Court reviewed de novo whether the 2001 plea satisfied Rule 11(f)’s factual-basis requirement and Rule 11(d)’s voluntariness inquiry.
The Court held the 2001 colloquy failed Rule 11(f) because the judge did not elicit an admission that petitioner was intoxicated while driving nor otherwise develop a factual basis on the record.
Although the DUI-3 plea was invalid under Rule 11(f), the Court declined to vacate the 2001 conviction itself and instead ordered vacation of the 2014 DUI-4 sentence and remand for resentencing without enhancement, consistent with prior precedent limiting relief to the enhanced sentence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the 2001 plea colloquy satisfied V.R.Cr.P. 11(f) (factual basis)	The colloquy was inadequate; court never asked petitioner to admit facts showing intoxication	The colloquy and petitioner’s statements supplied an implicit factual basis	Held: Colloquy inadequate under Rule 11(f); no admission or specific inquiry that petitioner was intoxicated
Whether the plea was voluntary under V.R.Cr.P. 11(d)	Plea was not shown voluntary because court did not personally inquire into voluntariness	State argued counsel, extended discussion, and petitioner’s affirmative responses supported voluntariness	Court: Did not reach the Rule 11(d) issue because Rule 11(f) error was dispositive
Proper remedy for defective prior plea: vacate prior conviction or vacate enhanced sentence	Petitioner sought vacation of the 2001 DUI-3 conviction itself	State argued relief should be limited to vacating enhancement on DUI-4 sentence	Held: Relief limited to vacating the 2014 DUI-4 sentence and resentencing without enhancement (Boskind/Collette precedent governs)
Timeliness/seasonableness of PCR	Petitioner filed PCR after DUI-4 sentence; argued timely as challenge to enhanced sentence	State relied on 13-year delay from 2001 conviction	Held: PCR timely as challenge to 2014 enhanced sentence; delay did not bar relief

In re Stocks, 196 Vt. 160, 94 A.3d 1143 (Vt. 2014) (court must elicit factual basis on the record; admissions by defendant or prosecutor-led factual recital plus defendant confirmation required)
State v. Yates, 169 Vt. 20, 726 A.2d 483 (Vt. 1999) (judge must question defendant personally about factual basis; failure is substantial violation of Rule 11(f))
In re Dunham, 144 Vt. 444, 479 A.2d 144 (Vt. 1984) (Rule 11 requires the judge to develop the factual basis on the record)
State v. Boskind, 174 Vt. 184, 807 A.2d 358 (Vt. 2002) (relief for defective prior conviction that enhances a current sentence is limited to challenging the enhanced sentence)
In re Collette, 185 Vt. 210, 969 A.2d 101 (Vt. 2008) (reaffirming Boskind: cannot vacate long-final prior conviction; relief is to strike enhancement on current sentence)