34 Cal.App.5th 933
Cal. Ct. App.2019Background
- In 2000 Gregory White assisted Brian Rhea in extracting/pulling methamphetamine from Coleman fuel; an accidental flash fire burned Rhea, who later died. White was convicted of second-degree felony murder (murder during commission of an inherently dangerous felony) and meth manufacture; sentence 15 years-to-life plus enhancements.
- White filed habeas petitions after Johnson v. United States (2015), arguing California’s second-degree felony-murder rule is unconstitutionally vague under Johnson’s residual-clause analysis. California Supreme Court issued an order to show cause directing the Attorney General to respond.
- The trial court and this Court relied on expert testimony (including detailed chemistry and lab-practice evidence and an investigator’s 1-in-5 fire/explosion estimate) and on precedent (People v. James) to find manufacturing methamphetamine inherently dangerous to human life.
- The majority framed the inquiry as record-specific: because the trial court relied on concrete, scientific expert evidence (not a purely abstract, categorical “ordinary-case” exercise), Johnson’s vagueness holding did not invalidate White’s conviction on this record; habeas relief denied.
- A vigorous dissent argued Johnson’s two-pronged vagueness test (judge-imagined abstraction + indeterminate risk standard) applies: California’s rule requires courts to assess an abstract version of the felony against an undefined “high probability” standard, producing precisely the vagueness Johnson condemned; dissent would find the rule void under Johnson.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (White) | Defendant's Argument (People) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether California’s second-degree felony-murder rule is unconstitutionally vague under Johnson | Johnson renders the rule void because courts must assess a hypothetical, abstract version of the felony and apply an indeterminate risk standard (high probability of death) | Johnson is distinguishable: here the court relied on concrete, real-world expert evidence of meth lab dangers (not a bare categorical abstraction) | Denied as-applied on this record: Johnson’s residual-clause vagueness not implicated given the evidentiary finding that meth manufacture is inherently dangerous |
| Whether felonious manufacture of methamphetamine is "inherently dangerous to human life" (predicate for second-degree felony murder) | Argued not inherently dangerous in the abstract; possible non-dangerous methods/conduct exist (e.g., professional labs, isolated sites, protective measures) | Expert scientific testimony and prior precedent (People v. James) show each manufacturing step and common processes (including "pulling" from solvent) are volatile and carry a high probability of fires/explosions | Held inherently dangerous on this record; James controls and expert proof may be used to make the determination |
| Proper analytic approach: categorical/abstract (Johnson) v. evidence-based/real-world inquiry | The abstract, elements-based inquiry is required by California law and thus suffers Johnson’s infirmity | California law permits (and in this case used) evidence and expert testimony to inform the abstract-elements inquiry, avoiding Johnson’s speculative “ordinary-case” problem | Court distinguishes Johnson’s categorical ordinary-case residual-clause analysis from an evidence-based finding tied to actual scientific processes; Johnson not controlling here |
| Remedy via habeas: whether conviction must be vacated or remanded given SB 1437 and post-Johnson developments | Johnson (and related cases) warrant reversal or relief; SB 1437 (2019) changes felony-murder law and creates §1170.95 relief procedures | SB 1437 does not apply automatically to final convictions; petitioner may seek relief under §1170.95 in superior court, but on current habeas record Johnson-based relief is unwarranted | Habeas petition denied; court notes SB 1437 provides a separate procedural path in superior court but does not moot the constitutional question here |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (U.S. 2015) (held ACCA residual clause unconstitutionally vague because it required assessing an imagined "ordinary case" against an indeterminate risk standard)
- Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (U.S. 2018) (applied Johnson to INA residual-clause language and found similarly vague)
- People v. James, 62 Cal.App.4th 244 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (held methamphetamine manufacture is inherently dangerous; appellate court permitted use of expert/scientific evidence to decide inherent-dangerousness)
- People v. Chun, 45 Cal.4th 1172 (Cal. 2009) (describes California first- and second-degree felony-murder structure and inherent-dangerousness inquiry)
- People v. Howard, 34 Cal.4th 1129 (Cal. 2005) (explained that inherent-dangerousness is determined by elements in the abstract and rejected application when the statute could be violated in non-dangerous ways)
- People v. Patterson, 49 Cal.3d 615 (Cal. 1989) (remanded for evidentiary hearing on whether furnishing cocaine is inherently dangerous; supports considering expert evidence)
- Henry v. Spearman, 899 F.3d 703 (9th Cir. 2018) (authorized successive federal habeas filing asserting Johnson-based challenge to California’s second-degree felony-murder rule; treated the argument as plausible for procedural authorization)