In Re: Wayne Anderson
829 F.3d 1290
11th Cir.2016Background
- Wayne Anderson sought authorization under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(3)(A) and 2255(h) to file a second or successive § 2255 motion challenging his 1995 career-offender sentence under USSG § 4B1.2(a)(2).
- Anderson contends Johnson v. United States invalidated the Guidelines’ residual clause (identical wording to the ACCA residual clause), so his career-offender designation violated due process.
- The Eleventh Circuit panel must make a prima facie determination whether the new-claim standards in § 2255(h) are satisfied before authorizing a successive § 2255 motion.
- The panel denied authorization based on Eleventh Circuit precedent holding the vagueness doctrine in Johnson does not apply to the Sentencing Guidelines (Matchett and Griffin).
- The panel acknowledged the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Beckles (raising whether USSG § 4B1.2’s residual clause is void for vagueness) and stated that if the Supreme Court rules the guideline clause unconstitutional, Anderson could renew his application based on that new rule.
- A dissent argues Matchett was wrongly decided, urges certification (or a stay pending Beckles), and disputes that denials of such certification motions should be treated with prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Johnson’s vagueness holding invalidates USSG § 4B1.2(a)(2) so as to authorize a successive § 2255 motion | Anderson: Johnson’s invalidation of the ACCA residual clause applies identically to the Guidelines clause, vitiating his career-offender sentencing | Government/Eleventh Cir.: Johnson does not apply to the Guidelines; Eleventh Circuit precedent bars Johnson-based Guidelines vagueness claims from qualifying under § 2255(h) | Denied: Anderson failed to make a prima facie showing under § 2255(h); Matchett and Griffin control and preclude relief |
| Whether a decision that the Guidelines residual clause is void would be a new, retroactive rule under § 2255(h)(2) | Anderson: (implicit) such a ruling would entitle him to collateral relief | Panel: Only a Supreme Court decision establishing that rule retroactively would satisfy § 2255(h)(2); Beckles could produce such a rule | Observed: If Beckles holds the Guidelines clause unconstitutional, Anderson may file a new authorization application premised on that new rule |
| Whether the panel’s denial is with prejudice (i.e., bars re-filing the same claim) | Dissent: Denials should be without prejudice; Anderson should be allowed to renew if Beckles changes law | Majority: Statutory framework (28 U.S.C. § 2244) and recent decisions foreclose re-filing identical claims; denial is with prejudice until a new Supreme Court rule emerges | Held: Denial treated as with prejudice to identical Johnson claim unless Supreme Court issues new retroactive rule |
| Whether the court should stay consideration pending Supreme Court review in Beckles | Anderson/dissent: Stay or certify to preserve claim until Supreme Court decides Beckles | Majority: Declined to stay; denied authorization under controlling precedent | Held: No stay; denial stands but relief remains possible if Supreme Court later establishes a new retroactive rule |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2015) (held vagueness doctrine in Johnson does not apply to advisory Sentencing Guidelines)
- In re Griffin, 823 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2016) (applied Matchett to mandatory Guidelines-era career-offender challenges and held Johnson did not make such claims qualifying new retroactive law under § 2255(h)(2))
- Jordan v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 485 F.3d 1351 (11th Cir. 2007) (explaining appellate prima facie threshold for authorization to file successive habeas applications)
- In re Baptiste, 828 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2016) (held court must deny motions seeking leave to file successive habeas claims that were rejected in prior leave applications)
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (held ACCA residual clause void for vagueness)
- Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353 (2005) (distinguishes between the decision that initially recognized a right and the later decision that makes it retroactive for collateral review)