In re: Walter Leroy Moody, Jr., 739 F.3d 1289

Walter Leroy Moody Jr. mailed bombs in 1989, killing Eleventh Circuit Judge Robert S. Vance and another person; Moody was federally and state convicted and sentenced (including a death sentence in Alabama).
After the murders, Eleventh Circuit judges who sat on the court at the time recused themselves from all Moody-related matters; several other judges also voluntarily recused.
Moody filed a state-postconviction habeas petition and then a federal habeas petition in the Northern District of Alabama; the petition was randomly assigned to District Judge L. Scott Coogler, who denied recusal.
Moody sought a writ of mandamus from the Eleventh Circuit ordering recusal of Judge Coogler and transfer of his habeas petition outside the Eleventh Circuit; he also moved for recusal of all judges on the Eleventh Circuit and transfer of the mandamus petition to another circuit.
Moody’s recusal claims relied on 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (appearance of partiality) and § 455(b)(4) (an interest that could be substantially affected), arguing that the murder of Judge Vance made the entire Eleventh Circuit and its district judges impermissibly partial or interested.
The Eleventh Circuit panel denied both the motion to recuse the panel and Moody’s mandamus petition, reasoning that time, lack of personal connection, and the remoteness/degree of any purported interest did not require disqualification.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether current Eleventh Circuit judges must recuse under § 455(a) because Vance’s murder created an appearance of partiality	Moody: The murder targeted the Eleventh Circuit and its judges; an objective observer would reasonably doubt impartiality	Court: Most current judges had no personal connection, were not on the court in 1989, and the connection is too tenuous	Denied — no appearance of partiality from mere service on the same court years later
Whether Eleventh Circuit judges must recuse under § 455(b)(4) as part of a "victim class" with an interest substantially affected by outcome	Moody: As members of the court targeted by the crimes, judges have an interest that could be substantially affected	Court: Any prospective interest is remote and weak; remoteness and degree together do not make it substantial	Denied — § 455(b)(4) not triggered by these facts
Whether mandamus is appropriate to compel recusal of District Judge Coogler	Moody: Coogler, as an Eleventh Circuit district judge, is within the victim class and his impartiality would reasonably be questioned	Court: Coogler had no personal connection to Vance or the threats, properly exercised discretion, and mandamus is an extraordinary remedy not warranted here	Denied — no clear and indisputable right to writ of mandamus compelling recusal

United States v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2003) (recusal under § 455(a) governed by appearance-of-impropriety standard)
United States v. Scrushy, 721 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2013) (objective lay observer test for § 455(a))
Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988) (recusal required where judge had institutional interest as university trustee)
In re Nettles, 394 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2005) (sua sponte recusal where courthouse and court were direct targets of alleged plot)
Clemens v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the C. Dist. of Cal., 428 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2005) (distinguishing Nettles where judges were not alleged intended victims)
Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347 (10th Cir. 1995) (recusal analysis extremely fact-driven; recusal when courthouse/chambers were directly implicated)
Delta Airlines v. Sasser, 127 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 1997) (§ 455(b)(4) not implicated by mere shared membership in a frequent-flyer program)
Moody v. United States, 977 F.2d 1425 (11th Cir. 1992) (opinion summarizing the bombing events and prior recusals)
Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33 (1980) (mandamus is an extraordinary remedy)
Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2000) (rule of necessity may prevent disqualification when no other judges available)