in Re Volkswagen Clean Diesel Litigation: Texas Clean Air Act Enforcement Cases
557 S.W.3d 78
| Tex. App. | 2017Background
- EPA notified Volkswagen in Sept. 2015 that it had installed software "defeat devices" in many diesel vehicles, prompting widespread federal and state litigation.
- Texas and multiple Texas counties filed Clean Air Act enforcement suits under the Texas Clean Air Act (TCAA) / Water Code Chapter 7; the State filed in Travis County on Oct. 8, 2015; some counties filed earlier, many filed after.
- The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred Texas state TCAA suits to an MDL pretrial court in Travis County for coordinated pretrial proceedings.
- The State filed pleas to the jurisdiction and other motions asking the pretrial court to dismiss later-filed county suits, arguing the TCAA precludes local suits once the State has sued.
- The MDL pretrial court denied the State’s pleas; the State appealed the denial of pleas to the jurisdiction.
- The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the TCAA’s enforcement provisions permit local governments to bring enforcement suits notwithstanding a prior State-filed enforcement suit (as relevant to the violations at issue).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the TCAA precludes local governments from filing enforcement suits after the State has filed for the same violations | State: once State sues, later-filed county suits are barred; counties lack a justiciable interest/standing | Counties: statute authorizes local suits "in the same manner as" TCEQ and contains no textual bar to later-filed suits | Held: No bar; plain statutory text authorizes local governments to sue regardless of State filing; counties have a justiciable interest |
| Whether words like "institute" or "brought" create a temporal/priority limitation on local suits | State: "institute" and "brought" imply only one entity can start suit for a given violation; penalty division suggests only first filer contemplated | Counties: those words mean "to begin" or "to bring" a suit; nothing in text imposes filing-order limits or exclusive priority | Held: Ordinary meanings do not create an exclusivity rule; text does not limit local suits by filing order |
| Whether section allocating penalties means local suits were intended only when local government is first to file | State: penalty-division scheme (§7.107) implies local suits only envisioned when local gov't brings suit first | Counties: allocation rule simply governs division when local gov't brings suit; absence of allocation for State-filed suits does not forbid local suits | Held: Allocation does not imply a bar on later-filed suits; it only prescribes division when local gov't brings suit |
| Whether common-law doctrines (e.g., dominant jurisdiction) or practical concerns require barring or abating later-filed suits | State: permitting parallel suits will be unwieldy and frustrate uniform State policy; dominant-jurisdiction principles support limiting suits | Counties: dominant jurisdiction does not destroy jurisdiction of later-filed courts; it permits abatement but presumes jurisdiction | Held: Practical concerns insufficient to override plain statutory text; dominant-jurisdiction does not negate counties’ jurisdiction |
Key Cases Cited
- Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) (standard for reviewing pleas to the jurisdiction / standing analysis)
- Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137 (Tex. 2012) (party asserting jurisdictional facts bears burden to affirmatively demonstrate jurisdiction)
- In re Puig, 351 S.W.3d 301 (Tex. 2011) (describing doctrine of dominant jurisdiction and related procedural remedies)
- BCCA Appeal Group, Inc. v. City of Houston, 496 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2016) (discussion of preemption and municipal regulation context cited for policy concerns)