2015 IL App (1st) 142384
Ill. App. Ct.2015Background
- Jenny and Julia were long-term partners; Julia is the biological mother of the child, J.T.H., born 2007. Jenny lived with them and participated extensively in the child's care and public family life.
- After the parties separated in 2009, Jenny continued regular visitation (every-other-weekend, daycare pickups, holidays) and shared child expenses; parties discussed adoption/guardianship but no legal adoption occurred.
- In January 2014 Julia terminated Jenny’s contact with J.T.H.; Jenny filed a petition for visitation on January 30, 2014 asserting standing under the equitable adoption doctrine.
- Julia moved to dismiss under section 2-615 for lack of standing; the circuit court granted the motion on July 1, 2014, holding equitable adoption does not apply in statutory custody/visitation proceedings.
- Jenny appealed. While the appeal was pending, the Illinois Supreme Court issued In re Parentage of Scarlett Z.-D., holding equitable adoption is a probate doctrine and does not apply to parentage, custody, or visitation; this controlling decision resolved the standing issue against Jenny.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Jenny have standing to seek visitation under the equitable adoption doctrine? | Equitable adoption applies to visitation; Jenny alleged intent to adopt and a close, enduring parent-child relationship. | Equitable adoption is inapplicable to visitation/custody; Jenny lacks statutory standing. | Held: No standing — equitable adoption is a probate concept and does not confer visitation/custody rights under Illinois law. |
| Could the parties’ long-standing parenting schedule create enforceable visitation rights? | The parties’ long-standing parenting agreement/schedule should be recognized and enforced by the court. | No consent decree or court-approved order existed; private agreement does not create statutory standing. | Held: Rejected — no court-approved consent decree existed; M.M.D. inapposite. |
| Was lack of standing properly raised via a section 2-615 motion instead of 2-619? | (Argued on appeal) dismissal under 2-615 was improper because standing is an affirmative defense better raised under 2-619. | Standing may be challenged under 2-615 where petition facially shows no legal right; plaintiff forfeited raising this procedural objection below. | Held: Forfeited and meritless; Illinois precedent permits standing challenge under 2-615. |
| Was dismissal appropriate on the face of the complaint under section 2-615? | Jenny argues facts alleged could support equitable adoption-based relief. | Complaint admits no legal adoption and pleading cannot overcome lack of statutory standing. | Held: Yes — even taking well-pleaded facts as true, no set of facts in the petition could confer visitation rights as a matter of law. |
Key Cases Cited
- DeHart v. DeHart, 2013 IL 114137 (Illinois Supreme Court) (recognizes equitable adoption doctrine where intent to adopt and a close, enduring familial relationship are proven)
- In re Parentage of Scarlett Z.-D., 2015 IL 117904 (Illinois Supreme Court) (holds equitable adoption is a probate/inheritance doctrine and does not apply in parentage, custody, or visitation proceedings)
- In re M.M.D., 213 Ill. 2d 105 (Illinois Supreme Court) (consent decree enforcing a privately agreed visitation schedule is binding when entered by the court)