In re Vicks, 56 Cal. 4th 274

Marsy’s Law (Prop. 9) amended Penal Code 3041.5 to extend deferral periods between parole hearings but allows earlier hearings upon change in circumstances or new information.
Vicks, convicted in 1983 of kidnapping, robbery, rape, and related offenses, began life term with parole eligibility; his initial parole hearing was in 2009.
After Marsy’s Law amendments, the Board found Vicks unsuitable and deferred the next hearing for five years, prompting habeas petitions and appellate review.
The Court of Appeal held that Marsy’s Law violated ex post facto principles as applied to pre-enactment crimes and vacated the five-year deferral.
The California Supreme Court granted review to determine if 3041.5, as amended, can be applied to pre-enactment lifers without violating ex post facto protections.
The Court held that Marsy’s Law does not create a significant ex post facto risk on its face or as applied to Vicks and reversed the appellate vacatur of the five-year deferral.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does Marsy’s Law create a significant ex post facto risk?	Vicks argues increased deferrals prolong incarceration.	State argues discretion and safeguards prevent longer confinement overall.	No significant ex post facto risk on face.
Is Marsy’s Law valid as applied to Vicks specifically?	Vicks asserts applied change prolongs his incarceration.	State contends ongoing Board discretion mitigates risk; no retroactive punishment increase.	Marsy’s Law valid as applied to Vicks.
Did Marsy’s Law intend to increase punishment?	Intent to punish retroactively implies ex post facto violation.	Intent serves purposes of victims’ rights; does not show punitive effect or intent to deny parole.	No intentional punitive effect; not ex post facto.
Does victim input under Marsy’s Law unduly affect parole decisions?	Victims’ views may improperly influence Board discretion.	Victim input is a due process element; Board remains bound by statutory criteria and ‘some evidence’ standard.	Victim input permitted but not dispositive; due process satisfied under framework.
Is the analysis governed by ex post facto doctrine applicable to pre-enactment offenses?	Need to address broader pre-enactment class beyond Vicks.	Court declines broader pre-enactment ruling; evidence insufficient for extension.	Court declines extended pre-enactment examination.

Morales v. Galaza, 514 U.S. 499 (U.S. 1995) (parole deferral context—ex post facto typically not violated unless longer confinement risk)
Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244 (U.S. 2000) (board discretion and system context govern ex post facto assessment)
In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal.4th 616 (Cal. 2002) (some evidence standard; parole decisions review)
In re Jackson, 39 Cal.3d 464 (Cal. 1985) (procedural change outside ex post facto—earlier deferrals to relieve board workload)
In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th 1181 (Cal. 2008) (parole suitability and evolving maturity considerations)
In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th 1061 (Cal. 2005) (parole base term matrices and standard of review)
Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (U.S. 1981) (good-conduct credits; punitive effect considerations)
Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (U.S. 1987) (presumptive sentencing ranges; regulatory vs punitive change analysis)
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (U.S. 2003) (intent vs punitive effect in ex post facto inquiry)
Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397 (U.S. 1937) (classic ex post facto retroactivity case (historical reference))