In Re Vanessa K., 352 Ill. Dec. 802

Respondent Vanessa K. suffers from schizophrenia and was involuntarily petitioned for psychotropic medication after she intermittently refused her prescribed meds during inpatient treatment.
Dr. Galbreath sought authority to administer Prolixin Decanoate as the primary medication, with Risperdal Consta and 20 alternatives listed in the petition as treatment options.
The trial court narrowed the petition to Prolixin Decanoate after questioning and discussions, and Vanessa was provided written information regarding Prolixin Decanoate (though not initially).
Vanessa left the hearing mid-testimony, later presenting a handwritten 'written appeal' that was illegible, signaling engagement issues related to her capacity.
The court found Vanessa had a serious mental illness, deterioration in functioning, and threatening behavior; it concluded the benefits of involuntary Prolixin Decanoate outweighed the harms and that she lacked capacity to make a reasoned decision.
The order was for up to 90 days, with no testing required for administration, and the court provided appeal rights to Vanessa's attorney.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the State complied with 2-102(a-5) written-info requirements	Vanessa argues the State failed to provide written information on all viable medications.	State contends written info on Prolixin Decanoate sufficed since it was the viable option chosen by the treating physician.	Written information on Prolixin Decanoate sufficed; three-day notice not required by 2-102(a-5).
Whether the order was supported by clear and convincing evidence under 2-107.1(a-5)(4)	Vanessa contends the State failed to prove lack of capacity and proportional benefits to harms.	State argues Israel factors show lack of capacity and that benefits outweighed harms with appropriate necessity.	Yes, the State proved lack of capacity and benefits outweighed harms; evidence not against manifest weight.
Whether the order is moot	Vanessa asserts issues are non-moot due to ongoing rights concerns.	State argues mootness due to 90-day limit, but exceptions apply for public interest and repetition.	Mootness exc. applies for the first issue (public interest) and the second (capable of repetition).

In re Joseph M., 398 Ill.App.3d 1086 (2010) (clarifies expert testimony standard for 2-107.1(a-5)(4))
In re Gail F., 365 Ill. App.3d 439 (2006) (limits on listing fewer medications than petition; treating physician's selection governs)
In re John R., 339 Ill.App.3d 778 (2003) (requires written information on medications if information dissemination is not complete)
In re Laura H., 404 Ill. App.3d 286 (2010) (written information must cover risks, benefits, and alternatives to proposed treatment)
In re Dorothy J.N., 373 Ill.App.3d 332 (2007) (importance of written notification under 2-102(a-5))
In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill.2d 393 (2002) (statutory interpretation of 2-102(a-5) and capacity assessment)
In re Michelle J., 209 Ill.2d 428 (2004) (statutory construction; due process in involuntary treatment)
In re C.E., 161 Ill.2d 200 (1994) (constitutional liberty interest and strict construction in involuntary treatment)
In re Israel, 278 Ill.App.3d 24 (1996) (factors for capacity to make a reasoned decision under 2-107.1(a-5)(4)(E))
In re Alaka W., 379 Ill.App.3d 251 (2008) (strict construction and liberty interests in involuntary medication)