In Re Tyler G.
M2016-02170-COA-R9-PT
| Tenn. Ct. App. | May 3, 2017Background
- Grandparents obtained legal custody of two children in 2005 and have lived with the children in Robertson County since then; prior juvenile-court proceedings occurred in Gibson/Lauderdale counties.
- In Feb 2016 Grandparents filed a combined petition in Robertson County Circuit Court seeking termination of parental rights and adoption of the children.
- The circuit court entered default against both parents, later set aside the default as to Mother, and modified visitation; Father never participated.
- On July 5, 2016 the circuit court "bifurcated" the petition, retaining the adoption claim but transferring only the termination-of-parental-rights claim to the Lauderdale County Juvenile Court for hearing, citing that juvenile court’s familiarity with the case.
- Grandparents sought interlocutory review; the Court of Appeals granted review to decide whether the circuit court could sever and transfer only the termination claim to the juvenile court.
- The Court of Appeals reversed: because the adoption petition vested exclusive jurisdiction in the circuit court, the circuit court erred in separating and transferring only the termination claim; both claims must be adjudicated by the circuit court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a circuit court that acquired exclusive jurisdiction by filing an adoption petition may sever a combined adoption-and-termination petition and transfer only the termination claim to a juvenile court | Grandparents asked circuit court to transfer termination to juvenile court for efficiency given juvenile court's familiarity | Mother argued the circuit court lacked authority to sever and transfer part of its exclusive-adoption-filed jurisdiction | Court held the circuit court erred: once adoption petition filed, circuit court had exclusive jurisdiction and cannot transfer only the termination claim to juvenile court; both matters must remain in circuit court |
| Whether judicial efficiency or ‘‘bifurcation’’ justifies splitting claims across courts/counties | Grandparents claimed efficiency and prior juvenile-court involvement justified transfer | Mother and opinion noted statutory scheme and venue concerns prevent such a split; bifurcation typically means sequential hearings in same court | Court held efficiency does not permit the circuit court to sever and transfer part of the petition; bifurcation does not authorize transferring substantive jurisdiction to another court |
| Whether the chosen venue (Lauderdale juvenile court) was appropriate for termination if transferred | Grandparents implicitly relied on juvenile court familiarity | Mother/guardian argued venue was improper because Grandparents and children reside in Robertson County and Tenn. Code §36-1-114 limits venue | Court emphasized Robertson County was proper venue and transferring termination to Lauderdale raised venue problems; transfer was improper |
Key Cases Cited
- Wilson v. Grantham, 739 S.W.2d 776 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986) (court that first acquires a matter takes exclusive jurisdiction to conclude it)
- State v. George, 968 S.W.2d 896 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (a court with exclusive juvenile-court jurisdiction cannot divest that jurisdiction by transferring to another court absent statutory authority)
- Norton v. Everhart, 895 S.W.2d 317 (Tenn. 1995) (court lacking subject-matter jurisdiction has no authority to transfer a case absent statutory authorization)
- In re D.Y.H., 226 S.W.3d 327 (Tenn. 2007) (juvenile courts are courts of limited statutory jurisdiction)