In Re TTF
2010 WL 4925010
| Tex. App. | 2010Background
- P.T. (the Department) removed T.T.F. from S.M. for a second time on March 5, 2008 after a prior removal in 2007; T.T.F. was 13.5 months old at first removal and later weighed between the 10th and 25th percentiles under medical care diagnosing failure to thrive.
- Dr. Hollis, a pediatrician, diagnosed T.T.F. with failure to thrive (a non-organic cause related to nutrition) and testified it could endanger growth and brain development; she attributed much of T.T.F.’s condition to environmental factors under S.M.’s care.
- S.M. testified to extensive periods of instability, housing changes, intermittent employment, lapses in Medicaid/food stamps, and a history of violence and criminal charges; she claimed progress after service-plan compliance and at the mission.
- Durham (caseworker) testified that Cleveland Street living conditions were hazardous (rat feces, exposed nails, rotting food) and that removal occurred after concerns about safety and S.M.’s threats to staff.
- Johnson (caseworker) and Reed (CASA) testified that although S.M. showed improvement, T.T.F. and J.K.P. had developed strong bonds with foster parents and that termination and adoption would be in T.T.F.’s best interest.
- The trial court terminated S.M.’s parental rights after jury findings under Family Code 161.001(1)(E) and that termination was in T.T.F.’s best interest, with substantial evidence of endangerment and lack of sufficient stability for reintegration.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court violated due process by retaining the case past the one-year dismissal date | S.M. asserts extraordinary circumstances required a hearing before retention | Section 263.401(b) permits retention for extraordinary circumstances without a hearing; extension can be oral | No due-process violation; extension proper and non-arbitrary. |
| Whether the trial court erred by not reducing the adversary hearing to writing for return of the child | S.M. argues lack of written order setting terms for return | Section 262.201(a) requires an adversary hearing but not necessarily a post-hearing writing of terms | No due-process violation; no required written order. |
| Whether severance/separate trials violated S.M.’s rights | S.M. alleges prejudice from presumed consolidation | Case(s) were severed or not truly consolidated; discretion to sever confirmed | No abuse of discretion; no reversible prejudice shown. |
| Whether there was error in the service plan timing/signature | Service plan signed late, delaying compliance | Plan filed without signature due to volatility; plan takes effect upon filing | No due-process violation; plan effective upon filing without signature. |
| Whether the court timely conducted status and permanency hearings; if not harmless | Delay violated statutory deadlines | Harmless error given later hearings; mandamus relief unavailable absent timely complaint | Not a due-process violation; delays deemed harmless. |
Key Cases Cited
- Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. 1985) (strictly construed termination statutes in parent rights cases)
- In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2002) (strict scrutiny in termination; clear and convincing standard)
- In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570 (Tex. 2005) (standards for sufficiency review in termination cases)
- In re S.G.S., 130 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004) (endangerment analysis in termination cases; justification for findings)
- In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534 (Tex. 2003) (strict scrutiny and standards in termination proceedings)