in Re Trelew Trust, 331299

Settlor Sreeram Veeragandham executed the Trelew Trust (restated Aug. 14, 2008). He died in 2015 leaving his wife (petitioner Anila Parvataneni), a sister (respondent Gautami Veeragandham-Anne), parents, and a niece (Samyukta) as beneficiaries.
The Trust created a Marital Trust (income to wife with principal invasion powers) and a Family Trust, with remainder distributions after the wife’s death to parents (50% split), respondent (25%), and a trust for Samyukta (25%), with lapse rules if certain beneficiaries predecease.
The Trust gives the “then beneficiaries” the power to remove and appoint trustees, each beneficiary entitled to one vote, cast by written ballot; substitute voters are provided for beneficiaries under legal disability.
Dispute: whether “then beneficiary” means (a) anyone with any beneficial interest (vested or contingent) or (b) only beneficiaries who are currently receiving income/principal distributions (i.e., those “then” receiving money).
Probate court held “then beneficiary” means those currently eligible to receive distributions (the wife only); respondent appealed claiming she, as a beneficiary, also has voting rights.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Meaning of “then beneficiary” for trustee removal/appointment	Parvatanen i: “then beneficiary” means current recipient of income/principal (wife only)	Veeragandham-Anne: “then beneficiary” equals all trust beneficiaries (vested or contingent) and thus she can vote	Court: “then beneficiary” means those currently eligible to receive distributions; respondent not entitled to vote
Whether respondent is a vested beneficiary affecting voting rights	Parvatanen i: respondent’s possessory status irrelevant to voting; only distribution eligibility matters	Veeragandham-Anne: she is a vested remainder beneficiary and thus a “then beneficiary”	Court: respondent’s vested status acknowledged but does not make her a “then beneficiary” for voting purposes
Whether Trust is ambiguous requiring extrinsic evidence	Parvatanen i: trust language is clear; no extrinsic evidence needed	Veeragandham-Anne: contested meaning shows ambiguity	Court: trust unambiguous; interpret plain language and give effect to each word; no extrinsic evidence considered
Proper construction principle when instrument drafted by counsel	Parvatanen i: technical terms should be given technical meaning; every word must be meaningful	Veeragandham-Anne: broader statutory definitions should apply to “beneficiary”	Court: apply ordinary and technical meaning to preserve distinct role of “then”; do not render “then” superfluous

In re Estate of Reisman, 266 Mich. App. 522 (discusses de novo review and that clear wills/trusts cannot be rewritten)
In re Kostin, 278 Mich. App. 47 (court’s objective is to ascertain settlor intent from the trust instrument)
In re Herbert Trust, 303 Mich. App. 456 (if trust ambiguous, may consider surrounding circumstances)
Brown Trust v. Garcia, 312 Mich. App. 684 (disagreement among litigants does not by itself create ambiguity)
In re Butterfield’s Estate, 405 Mich. 702 (when prepared by skilled draftsman, technical terms get technical meanings)
In re Childress Trust, 194 Mich. App. (recognizes vested remainder interests may be possessory only later)
In re Burruss Estate, 152 Mich. App. 660 (addresses when extrinsic drafting evidence may be excluded)