In re: Tracy Garrett
908 F.3d 686
11th Cir.2018Background
- Tracy Garrett is serving 480 months after convictions for two carjackings, two bank robberies, and two § 924(c) firearms counts; most of his sentence is from consecutive § 924(c) terms.
- Garrett has repeatedly (13th application) sought leave to file a second or successive § 2255 motion in the Eleventh Circuit; twelve prior requests were denied.
- He challenges the § 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause as unconstitutionally vague in light of Johnson and Dimaya, asserting that those cases create a new, retroactive rule permitting collateral relief.
- The Eleventh Circuit decided en banc in Ovalles that § 924(c)(3)(B) is not unconstitutionally vague because it uses a conduct-based (not categorical) approach; that decision postdates Garrett’s sentencing.
- Garrett also raises other claims (indictment form inconsistency, suppression/appeal errors, and denial of his first § 2255), which are neither new evidence nor based on a newly made-retroactive constitutional rule.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Johnson/Dimaya render § 924(c)(3)(B) unconstitutionally vague | Johnson and Dimaya create a new, retroactive rule invalidating § 924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause | Ovalles controls: § 924(c)(3)(B) uses a conduct-based approach and is not vague | Denied — Johnson/Dimaya do not invalidate § 924(c)(3)(B); Ovalles blocks successive relief |
| Whether Garrett may file a second or successive § 2255 based on Johnson rule | Garrett invokes Johnson (made retroactive by Welch) to obtain leave | Statutory gatekeeping: § 2255(h) requires a new rule made retroactive by the Supreme Court that applies; Ovalles shows no such rule for § 924(c) | Denied — statutory standard not met because Johnson/Dimaya do not apply to § 924(c) |
| Whether change in circuit interpretation (categorical → conduct-based) is a new constitutional rule | Garrett argues prior categorical interpretation affected his sentence | Court: a reinterpretation of a statute is not a new rule of constitutional law under § 2255(h)(2) | Denied — reinterpretation is not a new retroactive constitutional rule |
| Whether Garrett’s other claims (indictment form, suppression, appellate review) justify successive relief | Garrett asserts due process violations and appellate errors warrant relief | Claims are not based on new evidence or a new retroactive constitutional rule; many are repetitive of prior applications | Dismissed as repetitive and denied for failure to meet § 2255(h) criteria |
Key Cases Cited
- Ovalles v. United States, 905 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (holds § 924(c)(3)(B) is not vague because it permits a conduct-based inquiry)
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (held ACCA residual clause unconstitutional as void for vagueness)
- Dimaya v. Lynch, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (held INA residual clause unconstitutional; discussed categorical approach issues)
- Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (made Johnson’s new rule retroactive to cases on collateral review)
- McGuire v. United States, 706 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2013) (prior Eleventh Circuit precedent applying a categorical approach to § 924(c))
- Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995) (example that statutory reinterpretation does not necessarily create a new constitutional rule)
- Gray-Bey v. United States, 209 F.3d 986 (7th Cir. 2000) (explains that a change in statutory interpretation is not a new constitutional rule for § 2255 purposes)
- In re Baptiste, 828 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2016) (discusses dismissal of repetitive second or successive § 2255 applications)
