In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Marketing, Sales Practices, & Products Liability Litigation
978 F. Supp. 2d 1053
| C.D. Cal. | 2013Background
- Single-vehicle crash (April 15, 2009) involving a 2005 Toyota Camry driven by Ida Starr St. John; she testified the car accelerated when she removed her foot from the brake and brakes did not stop the car. Plaintiff is the estate; defendants are Toyota entities.
- Extensive expert discovery: plaintiffs and defendants offered competing experts on medical/driver condition, braking, mechanical corrosion in the throttle body, and complex embedded software causes. Parties filed multiple Daubert motions to exclude expert opinions.
- Court resolved numerous Daubert challenges, admitting many expert opinions in part and excluding others (notably excluding testimony about a specific ‘‘full-throttle bug’’ that was testable but not tested, and excluding various ultimate-causation opinions).
- Toyota moved for summary judgment on all claims; court considered expert admissibility first because it materially affected the summary judgment record.
- Court granted summary judgment for Toyota on manufacturing-defect and negligence claims; denied summary judgment on design-defect and failure-to-warn claims, holding a reasonable jury could find a design defect or inadequate post‑sale warnings based on circumstantial evidence and expert testimony.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of expert testimony (Daubert standard) | Experts' specialized opinions should be admitted to explain complex software, mechanical, and human factors evidence | Many expert opinions are unreliable, speculative, or irrelevant under Daubert/Kumho and Rule 702 | Court performed gatekeeping: granted in part and denied in part; excluded specific opinions (e.g., institutional-bias opinion of Kam; FTB and untested specific bug testimony), admitted others subject to limits |
| Whether expert testimony must identify a specific defect to survive | Plaintiff: Georgia law does not require pinpointing a single specific defect; circumstantial evidence and multiple expert opinions may suffice | Toyota: plaintiff must identify a specific defect and show it caused the crash; absent that, summary judgment is required | Court: under Georgia law and applicable precedent, plaintiff need not identify one precise defect when evidence shows a malfunction and the product cannot record failures; circumstantial proof may support design-defect claim |
| Summary judgment on design vs manufacturing/ negligence claims | Design-defect and failure-to-warn claims survive summary judgment based on expert evidence about software design, potential single points of failure, alternative safe designs, and Toyota's post-sale reports | Toyota sought full summary judgment arguing lack of traceable defect, inability to prove fail-safe malfunction, and alternative explanations (pedal misapplication) | Court denied summary judgment on design-defect and failure-to-warn claims (triable issues exist); granted summary judgment to Toyota on manufacturing-defect and negligence claims (plaintiff not proceeding on manufacturing claim; negligent design claims not actionable under Georgia law) |
| Use of other‑incidents/industry-standards evidence and alternative design opinions | Plaintiff: evidence of other similar incidents, coding-standard departures, and feasible alternative designs (BOS, auxiliary vacuum pump) are relevant to risk-utility analysis | Toyota: many such opinions irrelevant or unreliable, some concern matters not shown to be causally connected to this crash | Court: admitted relevant OSIs and expert testimony on alternative designs and coding practices for risk-utility analysis, excluding portions that were irrelevant or lacked reliable foundation |
Key Cases Cited
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579 (U.S. 1993) (trial court gatekeeping standard for expert admissibility)
- Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (U.S. 1999) (Daubert principles apply to non‑scientific expert testimony)
- Primiano v. Cook, 598 F.3d 558 (9th Cir. 2010) (expert testimony need not establish every element and weaknesses often go to weight)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (U.S. 1986) (summary judgment standards and allocation of burden)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (U.S. 1986) (genuine issue of material fact standard)
- Banks v. ICI Americas, 264 Ga. 732 (Ga. 1994) (Georgia adopts risk‑utility test for design‑defect claims)
- Dura Auto. Sys. of Ind., Inc. v. CTS Corp., 285 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 2002) (limits on an expert serving as a conduit for another expert’s undisclosed opinions)