86 A.3d 429
Vt.2013Background
- Edwin Towne was convicted of murder in 1989; his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal in State v. Towne. He has sought multiple post-conviction petitions; all were denied.
- In 2011 Towne requested mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) testing of hairs found on the victim’s body and sought comparison to his former girlfriend’s son, whom he alleges committed the murder.
- The trial court denied the testing request on summary judgment, finding Towne could not show a "reasonable probability" the test results would have produced a different trial outcome; the court also noted it could not compel the son to provide a sample.
- The requested testing was mtDNA (not nuclear DNA); mtDNA can identify matrilineal lineage but cannot uniquely distinguish among maternal relatives.
- The court emphasized that even if mtDNA showed the hairs matched the girlfriend or her son, the evidence would be consistent with multiple explanations (including transfer by Towne) and would not undermine confidence in the jury’s verdict given other trial evidence (bullets linked to Towne’s gun, his presence on the road, and his refusal to comply with a nontestimonial order).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Towne) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standard for post-conviction DNA testing under the Innocence Protection Act | Towne argued the requested DNA would create a reasonable probability of a different outcome | State argued petitioner must meet the statute’s reasonable-probability requirement and failed to do so | Court held the statute adopts the Strickland-style reasonable-probability standard: "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." |
| Burden of proof — whether preponderance of evidence required | Towne implied courts must find, by preponderance, a reasonable probability | State maintained the statutory reasonable-probability standard governs (not preponderance) | Court held petitioner need not prove by a preponderance; the less onerous Strickland standard applies. |
| Whether mtDNA test results could produce a reasonable probability of a different verdict | Towne contended an mtDNA match to the girlfriend’s son would point to an alternate perpetrator and materially affect the verdict | State argued mtDNA match to maternal relatives is non-unique, explainable by transfer, and would not contradict the State’s evidence | Court held mtDNA results (match to girlfriend or son) would be too speculative and would not sufficiently undermine confidence in the jury’s verdict. |
| Whether inability to obtain son’s sample defeats request | Towne sought court order to obtain son’s sample or presumed it could be compared via a database | State noted court could not compel the son and that a voluntary sample or database entry was speculative | Court affirmed denial — even assuming best-case comparison available, the result would not create reasonable probability of different outcome. |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (defines "reasonable probability" as sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (materiality/"reasonable probability" standard in Brady line)
- United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (Brady materiality standard discussion)
- United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) (establishing materiality framework cited for reasonable doubt creation)
- State v. Towne, 158 Vt. 607, 615 A.2d 484 (1992) (direct appeal affirming Towne’s conviction and noting juror inference from refusal to submit to nontestimonial order)
- State v. Goyette, 156 Vt. 591, 594 A.2d 432 (1991) (quoting that newly presented evidence must "create[] a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist")
- State v. Dupigney, 988 A.2d 851 (Conn. 2010) (adopting Strickland-like standard for post-conviction DNA testing)
- Richardson v. Superior Court, 183 P.3d 1199 (Cal. 2008) (explaining reasonable-probability standard for post-conviction DNA testing)