In Re: TikTok, Inc.
85 F.4th 352
5th Cir.2023Background
- Plaintiff Beijing Meishe (a Chinese company) sued TikTok and related entities in the W.D. Tex. (Waco) alleging copyright infringement, trade-secret misappropriation, Lanham Act false advertising, and related state-law claims based on alleged use of Meishe’s Chinese source code to build TikTok’s video-editing functionality.
- The development of the disputed code occurred in China; implementation into TikTok was done largely by an engineering team based in Mountain View (N.D. Cal.); only Chinese developers and that California engineering team have security access to the source code. TikTok has a large business office in Austin (W.D. Tex.) that performed no engineering work related to the feature.
- TikTok moved under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to transfer the case to the Northern District of California. The magistrate judge recommended denial; the district court adopted the recommendation. The motion-to-transfer was pending for about 11–14 months while the case proceeded through discovery and toward trial.
- TikTok petitioned the Fifth Circuit for a writ of mandamus, arguing the district court’s denial was a clear abuse of discretion because NDCA is clearly more convenient given where evidence and witnesses are located.
- The Fifth Circuit granted mandamus, finding that the district court clearly abused its discretion (especially on sources-of-proof and witness-convenience factors), that other factors were at most neutral, and that the writ was appropriate given the court’s delay and the broader importance of venue consistency.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Meishe) | Defendant's Argument (TikTok) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether mandamus is warranted to compel transfer under § 1404(a) | Denied transfer was not a clear abuse; W.D. Tex. is a proper forum | Denial was a clear abuse of discretion; NDCA is clearly more convenient | Granted mandamus; transfer ordered to N.D. Cal. |
| Relative ease of access to sources of proof (source code) | Source code is electronic and thus equally accessible in Texas | Only Chinese developers and NDCA engineers have security access; no relevant evidence in W.D. Tex. | Court abused discretion by treating sources as equally accessible; factor favors transfer |
| Cost of attendance for willing witnesses (100-mile rule) | Key witnesses are in China so factor is neutral; one engineer in Texas reduces inconvenience | Most witnesses (China and California) would travel far to Waco; NDCA is clearly more convenient | Factor favors transfer under the 100‑mile rule; district court abused discretion in holding otherwise |
| Consideration of post‑motion delay and practical problems (factors 4 & 5) | District court properly weighed case progress and docket efficiency in denying transfer | Court delayed ruling ~11–14 months and then penalized transfer based on post‑motion progress; that was improper | District court abused discretion by relying on post‑motion progress and delay; those factors were, at most, neutral |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2008) (establishes multi‑factor § 1404(a) transfer framework and mandamus review standard)
- In re Radmax, Ltd., 720 F.3d 285 (5th Cir. 2013) (clarifies when denial of transfer is a clear abuse of discretion warranting mandamus)
- Planned Parenthood Fed'n Am., Inc. v. 52 F.4th 625 (5th Cir. 2022) (addresses weight of factors when evidence is electronic and witness willingness is unalleged)
- Def. Distributed v. Bruck, 30 F.4th 414 (5th Cir. 2022) (limits use of hypothetical personal‑jurisdiction concerns in § 1404(a) analysis)
- In re Horseshoe Ent., 337 F.3d 429 (5th Cir. 2003) (directs that § 1404(a) motions be given top priority)
- Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Dist. of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367 (U.S. 2004) (sets mandamus prerequisites)
- In re Nintendo Co., 589 F.3d 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (applies distance/witness inconvenience analysis under § 1404(a))
- Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall‑Street.com, L.L.C., 139 S. Ct. 881 (U.S. 2019) (recognizes enforceability of foreign copyrights in U.S. litigation)