In Re the Trust of Hildebrandt
388 P.3d 918
Kan. Ct. App.2017Background
- Clarence and Wayne Hildebrandt executed nearly identical trusts; they were cotrustees and named Edward F. Wiegers as successor trustee, with his firm (and successor firm) as alternate successor trustees.
- Clarence amended the trust in 2003 to add a no‑contest provision disinheriting anyone who contests or interferes with trust administration.
- Clarence died in 2004; Wiegers later died, and Brinegar (successor firm) claims it is the named successor trustee.
- In 2015 Wayne (current trustee) petitioned the court, with unanimous beneficiary consents, to appoint niece Ann Claeys as successor trustee instead of Brinegar.
- The magistrate approved Wayne’s appointment; the district court affirmed; Brinegar appealed arguing it had standing and that replacing it would violate a material purpose of the trust.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Brinegar have standing to challenge the modification? | Brinegar: as successor trustee it may challenge replacement. | Wayne: Brinegar lacks standing because it is being replaced. | Brinegar has standing as successor trustee under K.S.A. 58a‑103(19) and 58a‑410(b). |
| Does changing the named successor trustee violate a material purpose of the trust? | Brinegar: appointment of an independent third‑party successor trustee was a material purpose; no‑contest clause shows settlor wanted to protect administration. | Wayne: successor identity is not a material purpose; beneficiaries consensually appointed Claeys. | Replacement of the named successor trustee with Claeys does not violate a material purpose; modification approved. |
| Does the no‑contest provision prevent beneficiaries or trustee from seeking change of successor trustee? | Brinegar: no‑contest clause demonstrates intent to protect all provisions, including trustee choice. | Wayne: clause prohibits contest/interference but does not bar court‑approved modification of successor trustee. | No‑contest provision does not clearly make successor‑trustee identity a material purpose; it does not preclude court‑approved modification. |
| Standard for determining "material purpose" in trust modification | Brinegar: detailed trustee provisions and contest clause indicate material purpose in trustee independence. | Wayne: lacking explicit language or circumstantial evidence that settlor intended trustee identity as material. | Court applies Restatement guidance and Kansas precedent: material purpose must be shown by direct or circumstantial evidence; here none sufficed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Stechschulte v. Jennings, 297 Kan. 2 (court reviews standing and subject matter jurisdiction)
- Hamel v. Hamel, 296 Kan. 1060 (rules on interpretation of trusts and settlor intent)
- In re Trust D of Darby, 290 Kan. 785 (discusses "material purpose" and necessity of evidence beyond mere allocation of benefits)
- Wright v. Cummings, 108 Kan. 667 (no‑contest provisions construed strictly)
- Superior Boiler Works, Inc. v. Kimball, 292 Kan. 885 (issue‑preservation and waiver principles on appeal)