619 S.W.3d 679
Tex.2021Background
- Houston ISD was found, after a Special Accreditation Investigation, to have longstanding academic failures and operational legal violations; the Texas Commissioner proposed enlarging a conservator’s role and appointing a board of managers.
- HISD sued and obtained a trial-court temporary injunction barring the Commissioner from imposing the proposed interventions; the Commissioner appealed the next day.
- Texas law (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 6.001) and Tex. R. App. P. 24.2(a)(3), as amended after In re State Bd. for Educator Certification, provide that certain governmental appellants automatically supersede judgments and cannot be counter-superseded by a trial court.
- The trial court nevertheless found HISD’s $200 deposit sufficient and allowed the injunction to remain in effect; the court of appeals vacated that counter-suspension but then ordered, under Tex. R. App. P. 29.3, that the trial-court temporary injunction remain in effect pending appeal.
- The Commissioner sought mandamus directing the court of appeals to withdraw its reissuance; the Texas Supreme Court denied relief. Chief Justice Hecht dissented, arguing the court of appeals’ action was an unlawful end-run around the statutory prohibition on counter-supersedeas and criticizing the majority’s statutory interpretation and delay.
Issues
| Issue | HISD's Argument | Commissioner's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a governmental appellant’s notice of appeal automatically supersedes an injunction and precludes trial-court counter-supersedeas under §22.004(i)/Rule 24.2(a)(3) | Trial court may require/accept security and keep injunction enforced by counter-supersedeas | Statute and amended Rule 24.2(a)(3) bar counter-supersedeas; notice of appeal automatically suspends enforcement | Supreme Court denied mandamus; court of appeals’ reissuance left injunction in effect despite statutory prohibition (dissent contends this violated the statute) |
| Whether a court of appeals may reissue a trial-court injunction under Rule 29.3 while an appeal by a protected governmental appellant is pending | Reissuance under Rule 29.3 is a distinct, permissible temporary-order power to preserve parties’ rights | Reissuance is functionally equivalent to prohibited counter-supersedeas and thus unlawful | Supreme Court allowed court of appeals’ use of Rule 29.3; dissent argues Rule 29.3 cannot be used to accomplish what §22.004(i) forbids |
| Proper reading of the phrase “any other rule” in §22.004(i) | Phrase is textually limited to other supersedeas rules and does not bar all Rule 29.3 relief | Phrase covers any rule; Legislature intended to prevent any rule-based counter-supersedeas around the listed entities’ automatic supersedeas | Majority reads the phrase as limited/contextual; dissent says that reading nullifies legislative language and defeats legislative intent |
| Obligations of appellate courts when reinstating injunctive relief against the State | Courts may preserve rights under Rule 29.3 without expedited action if warranted | When courts effectively restrain the State despite legislative policy, they should expedite resolution and avoid using Rule 29.3 to circumvent statute | Supreme Court denied mandamus; dissent criticizes delay and urges expedited resolution or narrower interim measures |
Key Cases Cited
- In re State Bd. for Educator Certification, 452 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2014) (court previously allowed counter-supersedeas, prompting legislative response)
- In re Long, 984 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. 1999) (recognizing automatic supersedeas principles for certain governmental appellants)
- In re State, 602 S.W.3d 549 (Tex. 2020) (Texas Supreme Court granted relief and stayed a court of appeals’ Rule 29.3 reinstatement of a temporary injunction in a COVID-era mail-in-ballot dispute)
- In re Xerox Corp., 555 S.W.3d 518 (Tex. 2018) (discussing reading statutory language as textually constrained/contextual)