in Re the State of Texas Ex Rel. Stephen B. Tyler
13-15-00339-CR
| Tex. App. | Oct 30, 2015Background
- Defendant Kyle Thomas Perkins was charged with misdemeanor DWI and pled guilty on July 13, 2015; the prosecutor did not sign a jury-waiver and objected to sentencing without a jury.
- The trial judge overruled the State’s objection, called jury trials for such misdemeanors a “sham,” accepted the guilty plea, and sentenced Perkins from the bench.
- The State filed a mandamus petition arguing the trial court had a ministerial duty to empanel a jury because the State had not consented in writing to the waiver required by Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 1.13(a).
- The trial court issued extensive findings asserting article 27.14 allowed waiver by counsel in misdemeanors and that article 1.13 conflicted and should not apply, citing docket congestion and judicial-economy concerns.
- The court of appeals reviewed statutory construction, precedent, and constitutional arguments and concluded the trial court erred; it conditionally granted mandamus, vacated the judgment, and ordered a jury trial unless the State consents to waiver.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a misdemeanor defendant may waive a jury without the State’s written consent | State: art. 1.13(a) requires the State’s written consent and approval to a jury waiver in all non-capital cases | Perkins/Respondent: art. 27.14 allows pleas and jury waiver by defendant or counsel in misdemeanors, so State consent is not required | Held: art.1.13(a) and controlling precedent require State consent; trial court had ministerial duty to empanel a jury when State withheld consent |
| Whether article 27.14 and article 1.13 conflict or can be harmonized | State: articles must be read together; art.1.13 governs waiver procedure | Perkins/Respondent: art.27.14 is specific to misdemeanors and permits counsel to waive jury, trumping art.1.13 | Held: statutes can be harmonized; art.1.13 governs waiver procedure and does not permit unilateral waiver in misdemeanors |
| Whether the State has a constitutional right to force a jury trial | State: not asserted as a constitutional "right," but has legitimate interest in trial method | Respondent: conditioning waiver on State consent violates defendant’s rights and is unnecessary when guilt is admitted | Held: No constitutional bar to conditioning waiver on State consent (Singer precedent); State’s interests are legitimate |
| Whether docket congestion and judicial economy allow the court to refuse empaneling a jury | Respondent: judicial economy justifies accepting bench plea-and-sentence despite State objection | State: docket concerns do not override statutory mandate and controlling precedent | Held: docket management is discretionary generally, but duty to empanel jury is ministerial and not excused by docket concerns |
Key Cases Cited
- State ex rel. Curry v. Carr, 847 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (trial court has ministerial duty to empanel jury when State withholds consent to waiver)
- State ex rel. Turner v. McDonald, 676 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (State’s consent required before court may serve as factfinder in criminal cases)
- Morin v. State, 682 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (procedure when defendant pleads guilty but jury cannot be waived)
- Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (U.S. 1965) (no constitutional impediment to conditioning jury-waiver on prosecutor and judge consent)
- In re State ex rel. Tharp, 393 S.W.3d 751 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (mandamus appropriate to require submission of guilt and punishment to jury when waiver not valid)