in Re the State of Texas Ex. Rel. Stephen B. Tyler
13-15-00323-CR
| Tex. App. | Oct 30, 2015Background
- Jaimie Rene Runnels was charged with misdemeanor DWI and on July 13, 2015 pleaded guilty in county court; he and his counsel waived a jury but the prosecutor (State) refused to sign a written waiver.
- Judge Eli Garza accepted Runnels’s guilty plea and proceeded to a bench punishment hearing over the State’s objection, citing docket congestion and the State’s policy refusing plea bargains in misdemeanor DWIs.
- The State sought emergency mandamus; the punishment hearing completed almost simultaneously with the State’s initial filing, so an earlier mandamus petition was dismissed as moot.
- The State then filed the present original mandamus petition contending the trial court had a ministerial duty to empanel a jury because article 1.13 requires the State’s written consent to waive a jury in noncapital cases.
- The trial court argued articles 27.14 (misdemeanor pleas) and 1.13 (jury waiver) conflicted and that judicial economy justified accepting the bench plea; Runnels argued the State lacks a guaranteed right to jury trial in misdemeanors and that article 27.14 permits waiver without State consent.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a misdemeanor defendant may unilaterally waive a jury and be sentenced by the court without the State’s written consent | State: article 1.13 requires the State’s written consent; trial court had a ministerial duty to empanel a jury when State refused | Runnels/trial court: article 27.14 permits pleas and waiver by defendant or counsel; docket control and judicial economy justified bench sentencing | Court: article 1.13 and controlling precedent require the State’s written consent; trial court lacked discretion and must empanel a jury when State refuses consent |
| Whether articles 1.13 and 27.14 are irreconcilably in conflict (so 27.14 controls) | Runnels: article 27.14 is narrower and permits waiver without State consent in misdemeanors | State: articles harmonize; 1.13 governs waiver procedure and requires State consent | Court: statutes harmonizable; 1.13’s plain text controls waiver procedure and does not conflict with 27.14 |
| Whether legislative history shows 1.13 was meant to apply only to capital cases | Runnels: 1991 amendments concerned capital offenses, suggesting 1.13 not intended for misdemeanors | State: precedent and plain text apply 1.13 beyond capital cases | Court: legislative history does not override plain language or controlling precedent; 1.13 applies and requires State consent |
| Whether docket management/judicial economy permits overriding ministerial duty to empanel jury | Trial court: docket congestion and State policy causing backlog justify bench plea | State: ministerial duty to empanel jury is statutory and precedent-based; policy cannot override law | Court: docket control is discretionary but duty to empanel jury is ministerial; policy concerns do not excuse noncompliance with statute and precedent |
Key Cases Cited
- State ex rel. Curry v. Carr, 847 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (trial court has ministerial duty to empanel jury when State refuses consent to jury waiver in misdemeanor)
- State ex rel. Turner v. McDonald, 676 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (trial court may not serve as factfinder in felony absent State’s consent to jury waiver; establishes ministerial duty framework)
- In re State ex rel. Tharp, 393 S.W.3d 751 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (mandamus appropriate where trial court accepted guilty plea and jury waiver without State consent; entire case must be submitted to jury)
- Morin v. State, 682 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (when defendant pleads guilty but jury not waived, trial court should direct verdict of guilt and submit punishment to jury)
- Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (U.S. 1965) (conditioning a defendant’s jury-waiver on prosecutor and judge consent does not violate the Constitution)