354 P.3d 950
Wash. Ct. App.2015Background
- Wheeler pleaded guilty in 1985 to third-degree statutory rape under former RCW 9A.44.090; that statutory provision was repealed in 1988.
- Washington enacted a sex-offender registration statute in 1990 (RCW 9A.44.130), later defining "sex offense" by reference to chapter 9A.44 offenses in effect at the relevant time.
- In 1999 the State charged Wheeler with failing to register (for conduct between 1997–1998), relying on his 1985 statutory-rape conviction as the predicate offense; Wheeler pled guilty in 2000.
- In 2013 Wheeler filed a CrR 7.8 motion (treated as a personal restraint petition) arguing the 2000 conviction is unlawful because the 1985 predicate offense was repealed and thus not a qualifying sex offense when the registration duty arose.
- The State conceded Wheeler met the "restraint" requirement (collateral consequences), and the court considered whether the 2000 judgment is facially invalid so it could avoid the one-year filing bar.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Wheeler) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Wheeler's 2000 conviction for failure to register is facially invalid because the 1985 predicate crime was repealed before the registration statute applied | The 1985 statutory-rape conviction was not a chapter 9A.44 offense at the time of the registration offense, so the judgment is invalid on its face | The term "is" in the definition should be read broadly to include crimes that at any time were in chapter 9A.44; legislature intended registration of pre-1990 offenders | Court held the judgment is facially invalid and vacated the 2000 conviction |
| Whether a guilty plea waives the facial-invalidity claim | A plea does not foreclose collateral relief for a nonexistent crime | The State argued waiver by plea (pressed at oral argument) | Court reaffirmed that a plea does not preclude relief for conviction of a nonexistent crime |
| Whether the petition is time-barred under the one-year rule | Judgment invalid on its face, so petition not time-barred | Petition is untimely under RCW 10.73.090(1) | Because judgment is facially invalid, the one-year bar does not apply |
| Proper interpretation of "is" in the sex-offense definition | "Is" means the offense must be a violation of chapter 9A.44 at the time of the registration offense | "Is" should be read to include offenses that were at any time part of chapter 9A.44 | Court adopted the contemporaneous-reading (as in Taylor): "is" limits predicate to offenses that are chapter 9A.44 violations at the relevant time |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Taylor, 162 Wn. App. 791, 259 P.3d 289 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011) (held predicate offense must be a chapter 9A.44 violation at the time of registration offense)
- In re Pers. Restraint of Hinton, 152 Wn.2d 853, 100 P.3d 801 (Wash. 2004) (conviction of a nonexistent crime renders judgment facially invalid despite a plea)
- In re Pers. Restraint of Coats, 173 Wn.2d 123, 267 P.3d 324 (Wash. 2011) (judgment invalid on its face when trial court exceeded statutory authority)
- In re Pers. Restraint of Thompson, 141 Wn.2d 712, 10 P.3d 380 (Wash. 2000) (plea cannot validate a conviction beyond statutory authority)
- In re Pers. Restraint of Martinez, 171 Wn.2d 354, 256 P.3d 277 (Wash. 2011) (personal restraint petition standards for unlawful restraint)