In re the Personal Restraint of Coggin, 182 Wash. 2d 115

Background

Coggin was tried with private, in-chambers voir dire of 12 jurors without Bone-Club analysis, despite defense counsel’s request for individual questioning.
The juror questionnaire offered a 'closed hearing' option; Coggin approved the form but did not design the closure.
Coggin challenged on direct appeal? No public-trial issue was raised; convictions affirmed (except assault) and a PRA petition followed years later.
The PRA petition asserted a violation of the right to a public trial under article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution; the petition was certified to the Supreme Court.
Lead opinion holds the public-trial right was violated but requires a showing of actual and substantial prejudice on collateral review; Coggin failed to show such prejudice.
Concurrence clarifies invited-error/prejudice framework, arguing Coggin invited the closure and should be precluded from relief.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether private juror questioning in chambers violated the public-trial right	Coggin argues closure without Bone-Club analysis violated public trial rights.	State contends no violation or invited-error distinction applies due to defense involvement and lack of explicit closure.	Yes, there was a public-trial closure violation.
Whether collateral-review prejudice standard requires actual and substantial prejudice	Coggin would be prejudiced per se on collateral review for a public-trial violation.	No automatic prejudice; prejudice must be shown unless an exception applies.	No presumption; burden remains on Coggin to show actual and substantial prejudice.
Whether invited-error doctrine precludes relief on collateral review	Coggin did not invite the error; defense consent does not amount to invited error.	Coggin actively participated in seeking private voir dire and drafting the questionnaire, constituting invited error.	Coggin invited the error; relief denied on that basis.
Policy/functional rationale balancing finality with public-trial protections on collateral review	Public-trial rights are core and deserve relief even on collateral review to preserve open justice.	Finality and collateral-review limits justify not extending per se prejudice on collateral review.	Finality concerns justify applying a higher standard; no automatic prejudice on collateral review.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Bone-Club, 128 Wn.2d 254 (1995) (Bone-Club factors govern whether closure is justified)
State v. Wise, 176 Wn.2d 1 (2012) (voir dire public- trial right extends to individual jurors)
State v. Paumier, 176 Wn.2d 29 (2012) (public-trial right applies to voir dire)
In re Personal Restraint of Morris, 176 Wn.2d 157 (2012) (presumption of prejudice for ineffective-assistance collateral claims; general collateral rules discussed)
In re Personal Restraint of Stockwell, 179 Wn.2d 588 (2014) (collateral-review prejudice standards; finality)
Orange v. Johnson, 152 Wn.2d 795 (2004) (presumption of prejudice for public-trial error raised on direct appeal; not limited to direct-review context)
State v. Speight, 182 Wn.2d 103 (2014) (plurality applying same analysis to Speight on collateral review)
State v. Frawley, 181 Wn.2d 452 (2014) (public-trial closure is structural error; prejudice not required to be shown for structural errors on direct review)
State v. Njonge, 181 Wn.2d 546 (2014) (public-trial violation is structural error; prejudice per se on direct review)
State v. Shearer, 181 Wn.2d 564 (2014) (structural public-trial error; Bone-Club analysis discussed)
State v. Slert, 181 Wn.2d 598 (2014) (public trial is a core safeguard; structural error open to direct review)
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (openness supports fairness in voir dire and trial proceedings)
Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984) (structural errors carry prejudice implications that are hard to quantify)